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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I contains the following section: (a) Background of the study, (b) 
Structure of apparel industry in India (c) Purpose of the study, (d) Significance of the 
study (e) Definitions of key terms, (f) Guiding paradigms and research assumptions, and 
(g) Organization of the study. 
Background of the Study 
The global apparel industry forms an integral part of world trade, particularly for 
developing and emerging countries where apparel accounts for a large proportion of total 
exports. Current global apparel market is valued at U.S. 3 trillion dollars and accounts for 
2% of the world's gross domestic product (GDP), while employing 24.8 million people 
globally in apparel manufacturing (Tovmasyan, 2017). Since free trade agreements 
within World Trade Organization member in 2005, multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
from developed countries have expanded businesses worldwide, by sourcing, 
manufacturing, and operating in developing countries where resources, production and 
labor cost are low (Sethi, 2006).  
However, the cost-reduction strategies and the prevalence of poor working 
conditions at supplier factories become a serious concern for global stakeholders (Hale & 
Wills, 2005). They raised concerns over the MNEs’ profit-driven business practices and 
negative implications of international production and investment (Kolk & Tulder, 2002). 
MNEs were urged to take their responsibility in addressing these concerns (Kaway, 
2009). This resulted in the development of MNEs’ code of conduct (CoC) policies. 
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MNEs in the apparel sector first introduced their formal code of conduct (CoC) in early 
1990s, and since then CoCs became important tool for MNEs in addressing social 
responsibility issues (Reich & Samet, 1996). Since then, several companies like Nike, 
Levi etc. introduced their code of conduct in an effort to integrate their social 
improvement goals into their business activities and encourage interactions among 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis (Kaufmann & Olaru, 2012).  
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1999) 
defines CoC as “commitments voluntarily made by companies, associations, or other 
entities, which put forth standards and principles for the conduct of business activities in 
the marketplace” (p.5). CoCs encompass guidelines, recommendations, and rules issued 
by any societal actors with the intent to affect the corporate behavior in order to enhance 
corporate responsibility (Kolk & Tulder, 2002). However, researchers have argued that 
due to the non-binding nature of CoCs, these are not legally enforceable (Keller, 2008); 
hence significant discrepancy exits on how those codes are defined (Reich & Samet, 
1996), and implemented. Other researchers have criticized CoCs for serving other 
functions, such as promoting brand reputation (Keller, 2008), easing consumer concerns, 
or improving stakeholder dialogues (Mamic, 2003). Therefore, outcomes of CoCs in most 
cases do not meet the objectives of improving labor standards and social compliance 
(Fredricsdotter & Stigzelius, 2008).  
 
The prior knowledge concerning firms’ compliance with government regulations 
indicates two regulatory approaches: mandatory and voluntary approach (May, 2005). 
The mandatory approach constitutes the traditional tool kit, where compliance is 
compelled through enforcement actions and by imposing sanctions on firms that are non-
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compliant. The voluntary approach engenders from the notion of one’s duty to comply 
with set standards; and compliance is obtained through education, financial and technical 
assistance and other inducements. At the same time, governments could perform different 
regulatory strategies, which could be coercive or non-coercive in nature, to gain firms’ 
compliance. Researchers indicate that firms may comply with standards due to the fear of 
detection of violations and punishment, cost and benefit calculations, social pressure, and 
feeling on civic duty (Braithwaite & Makkai, 1991; Levi, 1997; Helland, 1998; May, 
2005; and Singh & Singh, 2013). These suggest different motivational causes for firms’ 
compliance (Feldman, 2010). Taken together, compliance regulatory strategies and 
motivations go hand in hand, and are the two potential factors affecting compliance found 
in the literature. 
Above approaches to compliance are also supported by the organizational 
behavior and leadership literature (Clark, 1991; Allen, 2008; and Johnson, 2013). 
Specifically, the compliance theory given by Etzioni (1975) posits that leaders in an 
organization utilize different types of power strategies to influence participants’ 
motivational involvement/commitment towards the organizational goals. Thus, power 
and motivation could be the main constructs of employer-employee compliance 
relationship.  
Within the CoC compliance context, a relationship similar to employer-employee 
is anticipated between buyer and supplier involved in managing compliance as the 
apparel supply chain is buyer-driven (Gereffi, 2001). It is assumed that MNEs (buyers) 
are the leaders that utilize varied power strategies to induce different motivations in 
suppliers’ to engage themselves in managing compliance with CoCs. Maloni (2000) and 
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Benton (2004) supported the role of power in the supply chain and indicated that different 
sources of power have contrasting effects on inter-firm relationship in the chain. On the 
other hand, Winter and May (2001) emphasized on calculated, social and normative 
motivations on firms’ compliance. Therefore, power and motivation can be the two 
important factors contributing to firms’ compliance. 
However, despite previous studies that emphasize power and motivation on 
compliance, past studies looked at these factors separately, without combining together to 
assess the overall compliance performance. This leaves a huge gap in our understanding 
as to how buyers’ power affect suppliers’ motivation to comply. Therefore, an 
investigation of the buyer-supplier compliance relationship through the lens of power and 
motivation, especially in the apparel industry where CoC compliance is extremely 
important, was deemed useful to gain an underlying mechanisms pertaining to enforce 
and implement CoCs more effectively.  
Structure of Apparel Industry in India 
To investigate the compliance relationship involving buyer-supplier power 
dynamics in the apparel industry context, this study is focused on the apparel exporting 
firms’ compliance issues within the Indian apparel manufacturing and/or exporting 
industry. India is one of the developing countries that emerged as a major sourcing 
destination for international apparel retailers and brands (Gupta, 2012). Presently, India is 
the sixth largest apparel exporter in the world with U.S. 17.7 billion dollar worth of 
apparel exports (World Trade Organization, 2015). The abundance of raw materials has 
given a competitive edge to the Indian suppliers due to its beneficial impact on cost and 
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operational lead time (Gugnani & Sunny , 2012). The apparel manufacturing industry in 
India had contributed highest (42%) to the textile and apparel export basket during 2015-
16, and has huge employment generation potential. It is estimated that a U.S .15 million 
dollar investment in apparel sector generates 56-84 jobs, in comparison to an industry 
average of 6 jobs for the same investment (Make in India, 2016).  
Although, Indian apparel manufacturing industry has huge economic potential, 
the incidences of non-compliances and CoC violations are routinely reported. For 
example, the Apparel Industry Trend (2015) reported that Indian apparel manufacturing 
industry is home to some of the worst incidences of child and forced labor. In addition, 
International Labor Organization (2015) indicated that the most common reason for 
workers leaving the garment manufacturing factories are poor wages, high production 
targets, poor working conditions, and difficult relationships between management and 
workers.  
The prevalence of poor working conditions and labor exploitation is due to the 
relatively smaller size apparel factories than in other apparel exporting countries, and 
industrial fragmentation (Mezzadri, 2014). The apparel industry in India is highly 
scattered and organized in clusters, with distinct production and labor practices, and 
product specializations. Most of the apparel manufacturing factories are small-and-
medium-sized, and fall within the less visible section of the supply chain that do not 
directly supply products to multinational enterprises (Kula and Tatoglu, 2003), while 
keeping them hidden from legal boundaries (Hale & Wills, 2005). The apparel exporters 
in India generally own multiple small or medium size firms rather than one large firm, 
have limited manufacturing capacity, rely heavily on subcontracting and unorganized 
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workforce (Mezzadri, 2012; and Gupta, 2012). These aforementioned characteristics of 
the Indian apparel manufacturing and/or exporting industry, thus provides an ideal 
context to investigate buyer-supplier compliance relationship in the apparel industry 
context. 
Purpose of the Study  
 
There is a void in our understanding of how buyers’ power and suppliers’ 
motivation regulate suppliers’ complaince mechanism. Therefore, aim of this study was 
to investigate the interaction between buyers’ power (grounded from the organizational 
leadership literature) and suppliers’ motivation (driven from organizational psychology 
literature) to estimate its effects on suppliers’ compliance mechanisms (grounded from 
the compliance literature) among Indian apparel export firms, which deals with the 
apparel buyers from developed countries on a regular basis.  
The presented study is based on the framework provided by Etzioni’s (1975) 
compliance thoery and French and Raven’s (1959) social power theory. Etzioni’s 
compliance theory describes interaction of leaders’ power on participants’ motivational 
involvement/commitment towards the organizational goals. Whereas, French and 
Raven’s social power theory identifies different sources of power that leaders’ use in 
influencing employees within an organization. A quantitative study involving face-to-
face interviews of Indian apparel export firms from Delhi (National Capital Region) was 
designed, and data analyzed through structure equation modeling (SEM) technique. 
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Significance of the study  
 
The shortcomings of CoC compliance management system and complexity of the 
apparel industry structure are becoming increasingly apparent. The buyers (MNEs) and 
suppliers (apparel manufacturer and/or exporter) are the two facets of apparel industry 
structure. However, the interrelationship among them had not been studied in detail. 
Therefore, this study was formulated to investigate buyer-suppliers’ compliance 
relationship, specifically in an Indian apparel industry setting. Towards this end, the 
study was expected to serve three important functions. 
First, this study has compiled key concepts from diverse literature of 
organizational behavior, psychology, leadership, and compliance. These behavioral 
concepts are important to understand buyer-suppliers’ compliance relationship, 
particularly in the apparel industry context. In addition, this study links buyers’ power 
strategies with suppliers’ motivations, and quantitatively tests the effect of these factors.  
Thus, this study adds a new dimension to the buyer-supplier compliance relationship.  
Second, this study contributes in understanding the compliance relationship, both 
from the influencing agent’s (MNE) and the target’s (supplier) perspective. From the 
suppliers’ perspective, this study contributes pinpointing power strategies frequently used 
by MNEs in the current market situation with an emphasis on the Indian market. This can 
ultimately guide suppliers’ on comprehending the consequences of different power 
strategies on suppliers’ compliance mechanisms. Results were also expected to aid MNEs 
in identifying effectiveness of specific power strategy in eliciting motivation that is most 
appropriate in producing a desired compliance outcome, especially in the Indian apparel 
industry context. Knowledge of motivational patterns common among Indian apparel 
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factory managers can guide MNEs on devising strategies to motivate suppliers in order to 
encourage them to comply with CoC standards.  
For instance, if suppliers are motivated by a sense of duty, non-coercive power 
strategies holds promise; and if normative motivations are lacking among suppliers, 
coercive strategies might be necessary. In addition, if MNEs find that extrinsic 
motivational pattern (inducement in the form of rewards, sanctions) are more popular 
than intrinsic motivation in achieving immediate goals, but less effective in achieving 
long term goals, this study will guide MNEs in devising compliance policies in such a 
way that it will encourage suppliers in staying motivated to comply with CoCs in longer 
term. Consequently, this research will also be useful to MNEs in explaining why certain 
suppliers are more compliant with CoCs than other suppliers.  
Finally, findings of this study would also provide important implications for 
policy makers in the industry from both the developed and the developing countries. The 
understanding of the dynamics of buyer-suppliers’ compliance relationship will be 
critical in determining appropriate strategies useful in fostering compliance. This will 
also help policy makers of the supply chain in developing appropriate incentives and 
interventions in addressing non-compliance issues within the apparel industry.  
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Definitions of key terms 
Key terms used throughout the text are defined in the following section: 
Multinational 
Enterprises  
It refers to the enterprise which owns and controls income generating 
assets in more than one country (Dunning, 1973; and Hood & Young, 
1979). 
 
Suppliers 
 
A supplier is a business firm that manufactures goods or provides services 
to other firms (Merriam-Webster's Dictionary) 
 
Codes of 
Conduct  
It is defined as ‘commitments voluntarily made by companies, 
associations, or other entities, which put forth standards and principles for 
the conduct of business activities in the marketplace’ (OECD, 1998, p.5).  
 
Power  It refers to ‘an actor’s ability to induce or influence another actor to carry 
out his or her directives or any other norms he or she supports (Etzioni, 
1961, p.4). 
 
Soft Power It is defined as the strategy where no contingency rules dictate the 
dispensation of rewards and punishments, and where individuals feel free 
to decide whether or not to accept the inﬂuencer’s requests (Pierro, 
Raven, & Cicero, 2008). 
 
Hard Power  It is defined as the strategy based on enforceable rules (or norms) 
supported by threats or of appropriate (negative) consequences. 
 
Motivation It refers to the forces acting on or within a person that cause the person to 
behave in a specific manner to achieve set goals (Slocum & Hellriegel, 
2007). 
 
Intrinsic 
motivation 
 It is defined as ‘the motivation to engage in work primarily for its own 
sake, because the work itself is interesting, engaging, or in some way 
satisfying’ (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994, p. 950). 
 
Extrinsic 
motivation 
It is deﬁned as ‘the motivation to work primarily in response to something 
apart from the work itself, such as reward or recognition or the dictates of 
other people’ (Amabile et al., 1994, p. 950). 
 
Compliance  The term “compliance refers both to a relation in which a person behaves 
in accordance with the directive supported by another actor’s power, and 
the orientation of the subordinated person to the power applied” (Etzioni, 
1961, p.59). 
Monitoring It is defined as the process of regular surveillance, verification, and 
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inspections of CoC implementation practices, such as supervising and 
checking the contractual agreements, employment and financial 
records, formal audits, and site visits (Reich & Samet, 1996). 
 
Enforcement It refers to the company’s reaction towards CoC violations such as 
corrective action plans, termination of the business relationship, dismissal 
of under-aged workers, cancellations of specific orders, and placement of 
the violating supplier on probation (Reich & Samet, 1996). 
 
Transparency It is defined as the accessibility of information concerning business 
practices, and full disclosure of information to all the stakeholders, 
including buying agents, contractors, sub-contractors, union 
representatives and the workers (Reich & Samet, 1996). 
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Guiding Paradigms and Research Assumptions 
 
Understanding phenomena and making sense of reality is the critical work of a 
researcher. A multitude of paradigm exists and every researcher must not only understand 
a study’s theory construction but also the guiding paradigm and assumptions of how 
reality will be explored and interpreted (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010). Hence, glasses 
researchers wear while interpreting reality are all analogies of different paradigms. This 
research was informed by the two guiding paradigms: (a) critical realism and (b) 
structuralism, each having its own assumptions.   
The first guiding paradigm that guides this research is of critical realism. The 
researcher assumes that reality exists and tries to know about reality through research 
questions and the data collection (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010). The researcher adopt 
scientific methods, and systematize the knowledge generation process by assuming the 
role of an objective analyst, making detached interpretations about the data that have 
been collected in a value-free manner (Morris, 2006). This enables a researcher to link 
and interpret the abstract ideas of the social world into precise measurements. 
Secondly, the paradigm of structuralism guided this study. According to Jaccard 
and Jacoby (2010), a deeper structure exists underneath the surface structure of society 
that represents a finite set of organizing principles and they serve as a universal blueprint 
for human behavior. As structuralism emphasizes on how people think, this study aims to 
discover the underlying mechanism pertaining to the buyer-supplier relationship through 
the lens of buyers’ power strategies, suppliers’ motivations, and their compliance 
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mechanisms. Through this research, it is assumed that there was an underlying principle 
that assisted in understanding the overall structure of the buyer-supplier compliance 
relationship in the global apparel supply chain.   
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Organization of the Study  
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter I presents introduction of 
the study and includes study background, structure of apparel industry in India, purpose 
of the study, significance of the study, and definitions of key terms. Chapter II presents 
literature review for the study and includes compliance and its mechanisms: monitoring, 
enforcement and transparency; theoretical framework of the study: Etzioni’s compliance 
theory, and French and Ravens’ social power theory; motivation and its classification: 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation; and finally presents the summary of research 
hypotheses along with the conceptual model for the study. Chapter III contains research 
methods, survey design, preliminary tests, data collection, and data analysis procedures 
used for conducting the study. Chapter IV present results of the study including 
demographic description of the study sample, assessment of basic assumptions, scale of 
reliability and validity, and model testing. Discussion of results and summary of 
hypotheses testing are also presented. Chapter V present conclusions of the study and 
includes summary, contributions and implications.  Limitations of the study and future 
research directions are also described in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section describes present understanding of the topics that are important to 
formulate hypothesis and serve as basic framework for the present study. Topics 
presented here include: (a) compliance, (b) theoretical framework for the study, (c) social 
power theory, (d) motivation, and (e) summary of research hypotheses. 
Compliance  
Compliance is a form of a subordinates’ response towards any request made by 
the superiors. The request may be explicit, as in direct solicitation of funds in a door-to-
door campaign for charitable donations, or implicit, as in a political advertisement that 
touts the qualities of a candidate without directly asking for a vote. In each case, the 
subordinates recognize that he/she is being urged to respond in a desired way by the 
superiors (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  However, the level of compliance depends on the 
way superiors’ monitor and enforce their standards and policies.  
Similar to the superior-subordinate compliance process, in case of CoC policies in 
the global apparel supply chain, MNEs from the developed countries urge suppliers from 
developing countries to adopt CoC policies and stay compliant with working conditions 
necessary for maintaining the livelihood of the industry workers, and safeguarding their 
health at the workplace (Bolle, 2014). For example, during the 1990s, when Nike was 
criticized for sourcing its products in factories/countries where low wages, poor working 
conditions, and human rights problems were rampant, Nike formulated its CoC in 1992 
that required Nike suppliers to observe basic labor, environmental and health/safety 
standards. In addition, Nike suppliers were subjected to different types of audits such as a 
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basic environmental, safety and health (SHAPE) audit, a more in-depth management and 
working conditions audit (M-Audit) and periodic inspections by the FLA, which 
constitutes their compliance mechanism (Locke & Roomis, 2006). 
Not only the footwear and apparel companies, but other companies in the global 
market like IKEA, one of the largest furniture retailers, also realized the need to get 
actively involved in regulating the environmental and social conditions of its suppliers, 
and thus the company decided to develop its own code of conduct. In 2000, IKEA 
formally presented the requirements of the code of conduct to all its suppliers around the 
world with the form of “IWAY” (Anderson & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009, p.79). IWAY 
defines what IKEA requires from its suppliers in regard to working conditions, child 
labor, environment, and forestry management (Anderson & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). From 
the above examples it is evident that MNEs set up compliance mechanisms to monitor 
CoC implementation and to control suppliers’ compliance behavior.  Thus, the 
understanding of compliance mechanism is important in determining the level of supplier 
engagement in compliance related activities. 
Compliance Mechanism 
 Lloyd, Calvo, and Laybourn (2010) described compliance system/mechanism as 
the set of mechanisms, processes and procedures that support the implementation of a 
self-regulatory initiative standards and/or principles, and protect its overall credibility. 
They focused on monitoring, and sanctioning functions of the compliance system in 
ensuring suppliers’ compliance.  
Although researchers indicated several processes involved in the CoC compliance 
management system, Reich and Samet (1996) identified the three major components of 
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compliance mechanism that encompasses other compliance management systems 
discussed by other researchers. These are: (a) monitoring, defined as the process of 
regular surveillance, verification, and inspections of CoC implementation practices, such 
as, supervising and checking the contractual agreements, employment and financial 
records, formal audits, and site visits (b) enforcement, defined as company’s reaction 
towards CoC violations such as corrective action plans, termination of the business 
relationship, dismissal of under-aged workers, cancellations of specific orders, and 
placement of the violating supplier on probation; and (c) transparency, refers to 
accessibility of information concerning business practices, and full disclosure of 
information to all the stakeholders (the buying agents, contractors, sub-contractors, union 
representatives and the workers). These three components are widely used (Kolk and 
Tulder, 2002, and Lloyd et al. (2010), and hence considered as comprehensive measures 
reflecting on the suppliers’ compliance mechanism. Therefore, it can be inferred that the 
compliance system is multi-dimensional and involves several processes in implementing 
CoCs. How can MNEs (buyers) enhance the suppliers’ engagement in managing 
compliance mechanisms? The next section discusses Etzioni’s compliance theory that 
explains the compliance relationship between the superiors (buyers) and the subordinates 
(suppliers).  
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Theoretical Framework of the Study 
 
Etzioni’s Compliance Theory 
Etzioni proposed a compliance theory for analyzing and comparing complex 
organizations in terms of position relationships between the higher-level participants 
(power holders) and the lower-level participants (those subject to the power of the higher 
participants). Compliance theory is based on the premise that organizations use power to 
make sure that subordinates comply with the set goals. This theory includes both 
structural, as it is concerned with the kinds and distribution of power in organizations, as 
well as motivational aspects, as it relates to the differential commitments of actors to 
organizations (Etzioni, 1961). This provides a useful framework for investigating the 
compliance relationship of apparel buyers’ and suppliers’ to the CoC implementation 
practices.  
 According to Etzioni (1961), “compliance refers both to a relation in which a 
person behaves in accordance with the directive supported by another actor’s power, and 
the orientation of the subordinated person to the power applied” (p.59). Etzioni’s 
typology of organizational compliance is based on the relationship between three types of 
power and the members’ involvement in compliance (Etzioni, 1975). He posits that 
power used by the power holders to control subordinates, and the reaction of the 
subordinates to that power comprise the compliance relationship within the organization. 
There are three powers that an organization utilizes for the members to comply: (a) 
coercive, (b) utilitarian/remunerative, and (c) normative. Further there are three levels of 
subordinates’ involvement in compliance: (a) alienative, (b) calculative, and (c) moral. 
18 
 
The next section discusses in detail the three types of powers and the three kinds of 
involvements.   
Types of power  
The word ‘power’ originates from the Latin ‘posse’ meaning ‘to be able’ 
(Sherman, 1983, p. 44). Etzioni had defined and explained three different power types. 
First, coercive power refers to the application of threats or physical sanctions that causes 
infliction of pain, deformity, death, and frustration, by controlling the satisfaction of 
needs such as food, sex, comfort, movement, etc., through force and fear (Etzioni, 1961 
and 1975).  The examples of the organizations that utilize coercive power to control 
participants’ are prisons, custodial mental hospitals, and basic training units in the 
military (Etzioni, 1968). A specific example of the use of coercive power would be a 
principal who dismisses or suspends a teacher (Clark, 1991). Participants abide by the 
organization standards in order to avoid discomfort caused by the use of coercion 
(Johnson, 2013). 
 Second, remunerative power refers to “remunerative power is based on control 
over material resources and rewards through allocation of salaries and wages, 
commissions and contributions, fringe benefits, services and commodities” (Etzioni, 
1975, p.5).  Wright (2010) suggested that those organizations that employ remunerative 
power assume that subordinates will do what is asked of them if they believe that the 
result will bring them some form of happiness, pleasure, and contentment. Thus, 
remunerative power employs the use of extrinsic or remunerative rewards to entice 
subordinates to secure compliance. The examples of organizations that use remunerative 
power include business firms, unions, farmers’ organizations, and various government 
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agencies (Lunenburg, 2012). One example of remunerative power could be a principal 
who would provide teachers with a microwave oven for the teachers’ lounge (Clark, 
1991). 
 According to Etzioni (1975), normative power refers to the influence that 
allocates and manipulates symbolic rewards and deprivations. Such techniques could 
include “employment of leaders, manipulation of mass media, allocation of esteem and 
prestige symbols, administration of rituals, and influence over the distribution of 
acceptance and positive response” (Etzioni, 1975, p.5)  Religious organizations, such as 
churches, monasteries, convents, and schools, universities, and social unions, are 
examples of organizations that use normative power (Etzioni, 1968). A specific example 
of normative power would be a principal who invites teachers to participate in decision 
making when it is not required (Clark, 1991). Through such normative power, 
subordinates would then commit to the organization (Schifano, 2011). Lunenburg (2012) 
suggested that that normative power controls through intrinsic rewards, such as 
interesting work, identification with goals, and making a contribution to society. Thus, it 
can be concluded that organizations’ use of normative power is based on promoting and 
sharing values to which their members subscribe, and encouraging subordinates to see it 
as the right thing to do.  
Types of involvement 
Etzioni’s theory includes both structural and the motivational aspects. The 
motivational aspect of this theory is referred in terms of involvement, which is regarded 
as the differential commitments of actors towards an organization (Etzioni, 1961). The 
term involvement is defined as “the cathetic-evaluative orientation of the actor to an 
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object, characterized in terms of intensity and direction” (Etzioni, 1975, p. 8). He 
considered involvement to be on a continuum, where the intensity of involvement ranges 
from high to low, and direction as either positive or negative. Etzioni (1975) identified 
three types of involvement: (a) alienative involvement that has an intensely negative 
orientation where participants do not have the same values as the organization does; (b) 
calculative involvement, which results in the mildly negative or positive commitment to 
organizational goals; and (c) moral involvement leading to positive orientation of high 
intensity and commitment to organizational goals.  
Congruent/Incongruent compliance relationships 
Etzioni (1975) proposed nine types of congruent and incongruent compliance 
relationships based on the interactions between the three types of power and different 
levels of involvements within an organization (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Etzioni Typology of Power and Involvement (1975, p. 12) 
Types of Power Types of Involvement 
 Alienative Calculative Normative 
Coercive 1 2 3 
Remunerative 4 5 6 
Normative 7 8 9 
Note: Number 1, 5, and 9 represent congruent relationships, while others show incongruent relationships.  
 
The combination of three relationships in the diagonal cells of Table 1 (coercive-
alienative, remunarative-calculative, and normative-moral) were considered congruent 
i.e. the type of involvement by the participant aligns with the type of power used by the 
organization to attain organizational goals. For example, the coercive-alienative 
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relationship could be found in a prison; the remunerative-calculative relationship in a 
factory; and the normative-moral compliance relationship in a church (Gibson & Mary , 
1980). The remaining six relationships in the Table 1 shows incongruent compliance 
relationships, meaning the type of involvement by the participant differs from the type of 
power used by the organization to attain organizational goals. Etzioni believed that the 
study of processes involved in the six incongruent types of compliance relationships 
could be useful in explaining the nature of organizational conflicts. Finally, Etzioni 
theorized that congruent compliance relationships are more effective in achieving 
organizational goals than incongruent relationships.  It helps in maximizing the 
participating member’s efficiency by providing the right inducements to perform whose 
contributions are required for improving organizational performance (Etzioni, 1975). 
 
Empirical evidences of Etzioni’s compliance theory 
In the last four decades the Etzioni’s (1975) compliance theory was investigated, 
supported, contested, and even changed in various educational and non-educational 
contexts.  
Taylor (1975) investigated the two models of social action programs in the San 
Francisco Presbytery. The denominational model was characterized by use of corporate 
power, utilization of specialized experts as reform leaders, dedication to goals of 
structural change in society, and promotion of standardized action in all organizational 
units. In contrast, the congregational model stressed ad hoc voluntary groups, utilization 
of laymen as agents of reform, goals of individual change and a cafeteria approach to 
action. As the denominational model of social reform was found to be incongruent with 
the normative structure of the church, resistance (negative involvement) towards church's 
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reforms were reported. Thus, Taylor’s research outcome supported the ineffectiveness of 
Etzioni’s incongruent compliance relationships. 
Cates (1980) studied the administration of five World War II Relocation 
Authority (WRA) camps using Etzioni’s compliance theory and confirmed the 
effectiveness of congruent compliance relationships, and the ineffectiveness of the 
incongruent compliance relationships. In another study Schlottman (1980) investigated 
the relationship between power used by administrators, teachers and counselors of the 
elementary school, and its effect on fifth and sixth grade students’ involvement or 
motivation. Results revealed that normative power used by the teachers did elicit moral 
commitment (positive involvement of high intensity) in students. Schlottman further 
suggested that elementary schools primarily used normative power, and use of coercive 
power only occasionally. The remunerative power was rarely used in these schools in 
gaining compliance. 
Mayer (1987) investigated the impact of mediator, third-party intervention, on 
parental compliance attitude in child protection processes. Mayer investigated thirty-nine 
parent negligence and child abuse cases using control and experimental groups. The 
parents in the experimental group were offered the opportunity to use mediation to help 
them arrive at an acceptable intervention plan, while the comparison group was not given 
this option. Involvement in terms of alienation, moral, and calculative beliefs was 
measured. Findings showed that the parents who were offered mediation felt less coerced 
into going along with plans against their will, and were more committed to the potential 
value of the intervention for them and their children. Thus, Etzioni’s hypothesis that 
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normative power tends to engender moral commitment or highly positive involvement 
resulting in normative compliance was supported. 
Azim and Boseman (1975) analyzed the power and involvement congruence 
structure in university settings. Unlike Etzioni's proposition that the university is a typical 
normative organization, the findings indicated that doctoral candidates perceived faculty 
members to apply both remunerative and normative power resulting in both, moral and 
calculative involvements, of doctoral candidates. Thus, the findings indicated that the 
university is a dual structure type organization in which two kinds of power and two 
kinds of involvement exist.  
In this light, Drummond (1993) identified dual compliance structures that go 
beyond Etzioni’s compliance typology. The dual structures are found in organizations 
that utilize two particular compliance patterns of similar frequency within an 
organization. For example, combat units in the military can be both normative and 
coercive where organizational effectiveness is raised when lower participants (military 
recruits) believe in the cause, although the underlying factor of compulsion serves to 
reinforce the participation in circumstances where normative commitments are lacking. 
Goldish (2011) suggested that military recruits eventually learn to accept the  
organization’s values and place trust in the organization over time, which ultimately lead 
to a gradual shift of recruits’ from alineative to moral involvement.  
Further, Drummond (1993) criticized Etzioni’s reliance upon factors in 
developing compliance theory’s conceptualization of power. She builds on Etzioni’s 
conceptualization of power by using French and Raven’s (1959, 1965) six power bases. 
In addition to coercion and reward (which corresponds to remunerative power in 
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Etzioni’s theory), Drummond used legitimate, expert, referent and informational powers 
in her analysis to gain a comprehensive understanding of the compliance behavior of the 
participating members. In this way, Drummond’s study establishes the relevance of 
applying French and Raven’s power taxonomy in understanding the compliance 
relationship holistically. 
Allen (2008) conducted a study to identify educator perceptions of power used at 
a disciplinary alternative education program (DAEP), a program designed to provide an 
alternative setting for students who have exhibited inappropriate behavior as outlined in 
their school district’s student code of conduct, and their perceptions of how students 
respond to their power in a sub-urban Texas school district. Results demonstrated that 
educators primarily used coercive power at DAEP; however other types of power were 
also found be used occasionally. The study participants agreed that students reacted in an 
alienative manner to the use of educators’ power. Consequently, the study findings 
indicated that Etzioni assumptions regarding the use of power, and response to the power 
used were quite accurate. 
 Based on the empirical evidences, it can be concluded that Etzioni’s compliance 
theory does well in predicting and explaining the relationship between the use of 
organizational or leaders’ power and participants’ involvement in understanding 
organizational conflicts, commitment, effectiveness, efficiency, and stability, with a few 
exceptions as seen in Azim and Boseman (1975), and Schlottman (1980) in educational 
settings.  
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The next section discusses (a) social power theory to discuss the types of power in 
depth in the compliance relationship contexts; and (b) participants’ involvement, 
specifically suppliers’ motivation to comply with buyers’ requests.  
 
Social Power Theory 
Although Etzioni’s compliance theory is useful for the scope of study because it 
establishes the relationship of higher-level participants (power holders) with lower-level 
participants (the subordinates) in complying with the organizational goals and directives, 
French and Raven’s (1959) social power theory that explains different power sources 
used by the leaders to influence their subordinates or employees within an organization, 
provides a more detailed theoretical framework for this study. This is because Etzioni’s 
power types were limited to only three power sources (coercive, remunerative and 
normative), while French and Raven (1959, 1961) power typology is more 
comprehensive. They used three additional power sources (referent, expert and 
information) that are relevant in the present context and were not discussed in Etzioni’s 
compliance theory.  
According to Raven (2008) the term social power refers to the potential or the 
ability of the agent (supervisor) to bring change in the belief, attitude, or behavior of the 
target (subordinate) using resources available to him or her. These resources form six 
power bases: (1) reward power, defined as a person’s ability to influence others’ behavior 
by providing them with the things they want to receive, (2) coercive power, referreing to 
a person’s ability to influence others’ behavior by punishing them or by creating a threat 
to perform a task, (3) legitimate power, as a person’s ability to influence others behavior 
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because of the position that person holds within the organization, (4) referent power, as a 
person’s ability to influence others’ behavior because of their perceived attractiveness, 
charisma and likability, (5) expert power, as a person’s ability to influence others’ 
behavior because of recognized knowledge, skills or abilities, and (6) informational 
powers, which is derived from the persuasiveness of communications and arguments 
provided by the influencing agent.  
The use of the above six powers can bring two kinds of social change: (1) socially 
independent change, where the subordinate behavior is altered permanently due to the 
persuasiveness of the change agent that brings in cognitive change in subordinates, which 
leads them to accept the change and continues it without the supervision by the change 
agent. For instance, when a supervisor uses informational power, the supervisor suggests 
plausible reasons to convince subordinates to adopt the change. As targets themselves 
realize the need for change, surveillance may not be required; (2) socially dependent 
change, where the change in target’s behavior depends on the change agent. The change 
in the target’s behavior occurs with or without the agent’s surveillance. For example, 
when the agent uses coercive and reward powers, to keep the target compliant, the 
target’s response relies on surveillance, while when agent utilizes legitimate, expert and 
referent powers, surveillance may not be necessary and the target responds to the trust in 
the agent’s power. Therefore, it can be concluded that the bases of power used by the 
agents differ in the way the social change is implemented, the manner in which the 
agent’s power is established and maintained, and the permanence of that change. 
Raven (1992) further classified the above six power bases into 11 sub-categories 
of power bases in the interpersonal power interaction model (IPIM). These power bases 
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are: reward (personal, impersonal), coercive (personal, impersonal), legitimate (position, 
reciprocity, equity, dependence), expert, referent, and informational power.  
In the initial French and Raven’s (1959) power typology, coercive and reward 
powers were presented in tangible forms (considered as impersonal) such as threats of 
being fired or fined, promises of monetary rewards/bonuses, or promotions. However, the 
personal approval from a supervisor could result in powerful reward power; and a threat 
of rejection or disapproval from someone with a target of value can serve as a source of 
coercive power. Therefore, personal coercion and personal reward was added to the 
original taxonomy to further help us understand the nuances of social change.  
Similarly, the legitimate power that stems from the social norms requiring the 
target to comply with the request or order of the influencing agent was further classified 
based on the position, reciprocity, equity and dependence of the agent. Legitimate 
position power requires a person to obey people who are in a superior position in a formal 
or informal social structure, such as a student obey teachers, and children obey parents. 
Legitimate reciprocity power refers to the feeling on an obligation to reciprocate to 
others. Legitimate equity power is based on the compensatory norm where a person has 
to do something in compensation of doing some harm in the past. Legitimate dependence 
power refers to the obligation to help those who cannot help themselves, or others who 
are dependent upon us. 
Although the finer differentiation of the IPIM model has proven useful in 
exploring the subtleties of the power interaction process in different social situations, 
Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998 showed that all the above power sources of the 
IPIM model can be subsumed into two underlying structures consisting of hard and soft 
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power strategies. Reward (personal, impersonal), coercive (personal, impersonal), and 
legitimate (position, reciprocity, equity), are hard power strategies; while the legitimate 
(dependence), expert, referent, and informational power are the soft power strategies. 
Other researchers have also supported a similar dichotomy between hard and soft power 
strategies. Also, empirical studies have documented the applicability of hard-soft power 
strategies in various educational and non-educational settings. Considering the 
comprehensiveness of hard-soft power classification, it is anticipated that this would be 
an appropriate classification in investigating the power dynamics in any compliance 
relationship (Yukl & Falbe, 1991; Bruins, 1997; Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 
1998; Koslowsky, Schwarzwald, & Ashuri, 2001; Erchul, Raven, & Wilson, 2004) 
Hard-soft power strategies  
Given that the global apparel supply chain is buyer-driven, (Gereffi, 2001) argued 
that the global apparel industry has the most powerful buyers within the supply chain, 
which greatly affects buyer-supplier relationships, including compliance. Thus, assessing 
buyer-supplier power dynamics would be useful in studying suppliers’ behavior towards 
compliance with CoC policies. 
Pierro et al. (2008) differentiate between the hard and soft power strategies based 
on the differences in the amount of freedom that the subordinates or employees feel in 
choosing whether or not to comply with the leader’s power. For example, under the soft 
power strategies, subordinates or employees feel free to decide whether to accept the 
requests of the influencing agent/leaders; while hard power strategies gave less freedom 
to subordinates and were relatively unfriendly, controlling and coercive.  
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Pierro et al. (2011) described hard power as the strategy based on enforceable 
rules (or norms) supported by threats or promises of appropriate (negative or positive) 
consequences. Soft power was defined as the strategy where no contingency rules dictate 
dispensation of the rewards and punishments, and where individuals feel free to decide 
whether or not to accept the inﬂuencer’s requests. 
Past studies have documented the application of hard-soft power strategies in 
various educational and non-educational settings in understanding the compliance 
behavior (Plax et al., 1986; Kearney & Plax, 1992; Roach, 1994; Elias, 2007; Pierro et 
al., 2008).  
Plax et al. (1986) researched college students’ resistance towards teachers’ use of 
Behavior Alteration Techniques (BAT). Results indicated that students are more or less 
resistant to any use of control in the classroom. Specifically, greater resistance was 
reported in using coercive control. Finally, it was concluded that students tend to be less 
compliant when instructors use coercive control (analogous to hard power strategy), as 
opposed to prosocial strategies (equivalent to soft power strategies) for student control. 
Additionally, it was found that when instructors make use of soft power strategies, 
students were encouraged and motivated to act in accordance with the instructors’ 
requests. However, when instructors use hard power strategies, students become 
competitive, feel excluded, and their self-esteem is undermined (Kearney & Plax, 1992).   
Roach (1995) investigated the relationship between students’ perception of 
teachers’ use of pro-social (stem from soft power strategies) and antisocial (stem from 
hard power strategies) BATs and their effective and cognitive learning over a semester. 
Roach concluded that the use of antisocial and pro-social techniques has an impact on 
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students’ edification, specifically, pro-social techniques were found to be associated with 
increased effective and cognitive learning, while antisocial techniques were not. Another 
study conducted by Elias (2007) on examining the use of power in university classroom 
found that students rated the use of soft power strategies as significantly more appropriate 
than hard power strategies in complying with the set standards.  
May and Winter (1999) conducted an empirical study on municipal enforcement 
styles of agro-environmental regulations in Denmark. The findings about enforcement 
styles of inspectors suggest that it is necessary to get tough up to a point, but beyond that 
the threat of coercion can be counterproductive. These findings cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of overly legalistic enforcement styles (coercive strategies), particularly for 
the Danish culture with its strong emphasis on cooperation and consultation (non-
coercive strategies) in regulation. 
Another study on firm compliance with environmental standards was conducted 
by May (2005). May examined the effect of two regulatory approaches on a firm’s 
motivation to comply with water quality standards. In the traditional regulatory approach, 
compliance is gained through enforcement actions and sanctions; whereas in a voluntary 
approach, compliance is obtained through education, financial and technical assistance, 
and inducements. Traditional regulation (coercive in nature) was found to be more 
effective than the voluntary regulation (non-coercive approach) in obtaining compliance. 
Finally, it was concluded that the two regulatory approaches should be thought of as ends 
of a continuum rather than as the sole choices. 
In 2008, Pierro et al. specifically examined the degree of compliance with hard 
and soft power strategies with targets’ (subordinates) motivational and personal 
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orientations within an organization. They conducted four ﬁeld studies in different 
European organizations (Italian military organization; Greek food company; three private 
Italian companies – a bank, a federation of small business, and a security company; and 
an Italian flight company) where intrinsic–extrinsic motivational orientations, desire for 
control, self-presentational styles, and self-esteem were respectively considered as 
antecedents of employees’ compliance with their supervisors’ power strategies. Results 
showed that compliance with soft power strategies is positively related to intrinsic 
motivation, desire for control, getting-ahead style, and self-esteem; and negatively related 
to the getting-along style only. Compliance with hard power strategies is positively 
related to extrinsic motivation and to the getting-along style, but negatively related to 
intrinsic motivation, desire for control, and self-esteem.  
 As manifested in the above studies, it can be said that application of superiors’ 
power enhances compliance among subordinates, irrespective of whether the power used 
was coercive or non-coercive in nature. However, some exceptions were reported in cases 
(Plax et al., 1986; Kearney & Plax, 1992; and May & Winter, 1999) where superiors used 
coercive powers excessively to obtain compliance. Since the hard-soft power relationship 
was found in different setting (teacher-student relationship, inspectors-municipal 
agencies), a similar relationship is expected between buyer-supplier due to the amount of 
power that buyers possess in the global apparel supply chain. Therefore, it is assumed 
that the perceived structure of buyers’ power strategies would determine the way 
suppliers psychologically construct their relationship with the buyers, which ultimately 
determines suppliers’ specific motivations and their level of compliance with CoC 
standards. Based on the above assumption, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H1a(b): Apparel buyers’ hard (soft) power strategies are positively associated 
with Indian apparel supplier’s extrinsic (intrinsic) motivation. 
H2a(b): Apparel buyers’ hard (soft) power strategies are negatively associated 
with Indian apparel supplier’s intrinsic (extrinsic) motivation. 
 
Motivation 
The Etzioni compliance theory relies on supervisor power and subordinate 
involvement in assessing subordinate’s level of commitment to the organizational goals. 
Although the compliance theory supports the motivational aspect of compliance, 
empirical research has seldom studied the effect of power on the subordinates’ 
motivational aspects of involvement to comply specifically. Besides, previous studies on 
compliance with social and environmental standards have emphasized the role of 
motivation. Therefore, in this research we intend to fill in this gap by studying the effect 
of buyers’ power on suppliers’ motivation, which was explained as involvement by 
Etzioni, to comply with CoC standards.  
According to Ryan and Deci (2000), motivation means ‘to be moved to do 
something’ (p 54). A person who feels no impetus or inspiration to act is thus 
characterized as unmotivated; on the other hand someone who is energized or activated 
toward an end is considered motivated. Slocum and Hellriegel (2007) suggested that 
motivation represents the forces acting on or within a person that cause the person to 
behave in a specific manner to achieve set goals. In fact, it is a force that drives 
individuals towards achieving personal or organizational goals (Ali & Ahmed, 2009). 
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Motivation helps in giving route to strengthening behavior, and triggers the tendency to 
continue (Abadi, Jalilvand, Sharif, Salimi, & Khanzadeh, 2011). From the above 
statements it could be inferred that motivation is a stimulus that triggers an individual to 
act in a desired way. 
 
Extrinsic-Intrinsic Motivations 
Two types of motivations have been identified by Deci (1971), extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations. These motivations have proven to be the most useful in 
understanding and predicting behavior in a large range of social situations (Pierro et al., 
2008). Deci (1971) described extrinsic motivation as the act of completing an activity in 
order to receive some type of reward. Amabile et al. (1994) deﬁned extrinsic motivation 
as “the motivation to work primarily in response to something apart from the work itself, 
such as reward or recognition or the dictates of other people” (p. 950). The psychological 
features of such orientation are mainly linked to cognitive mechanisms like the 
assessment of work as a means to some tangible end (Kruglanski, 1975). Therefore, 
extrinsic motivation includes orientations toward money/rewards, recognition, 
competition, and the dictates of other people (Pierro et al., 2008).  
On the other hand, intrinsic motivation as described by Deci (1971) is the act of 
completing an activity for the pleasure of doing the activity itself. For example, a child 
who cleans his room for the purpose of displaying his baseball card collection is said to 
be intrinsically motivated. Amabile and colleagues (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 
1994) defined intrinsic motivation as “the motivation to engage in work primarily for its 
own sake, because the work itself is interesting, engaging, or in some way satisfying” (p. 
950). Intrinsic motivation represents a combination of cognitive and affective 
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components, including interest and excitement (Izard, 1978); task involvement 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1978); happiness, surprise, and fun (Pretty & Seligman, 1983); and 
self-determination and competence (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Moss (n.d.) reported that when 
individuals experience intrinsic motivation, they engage in behaviors they perceive as 
inherently interesting, satisfying, gratifying, enjoyable, fulfilling, and absorbing. 
In 2011, Muhammad et al. examined the relationship of organizational 
effectiveness, and employee motivation and performance in the telecommunication and 
banking sector of Pakistan, and found positive correlation between employee motivation 
and organizational effectiveness. The research findings of Zaidi and Abbas (2011) 
analyzed the impact of rewards on employee motivation and also found a strong positive 
relationship between rewards and motivation among employees.  
Further, Rutherford (1990) mentioned that a motivated employee constantly 
looking for improved practices for work helps in improving organizational performance. 
Anne (1994) indicated that motivated employees develop a strategic partnership with the 
organization, and their commitments and loyalty towards their organization eventually 
increases. Moreover, Buttner and Moore (1997) quantified the effect of employee 
motivation on customer satisfaction and company revenue, and concluded that 
employees’ productivity increases when they are motivated. In contrast, Saqib, Abrar, 
Sabir , Bashir, and Baig (2015) found that motivated employees not only affect tangible 
returns, but also intangible returns (in the form of enhancing corporate culture) that are 
equally important for the success of the organization. Based on these research findings, it 
can be concluded that motivation plays an important role in enhancing organizational 
performance.  
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Specifically, the role of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in enhancing 
organizational performance has been emphasized. For instance, motivations in the form 
of constant payment of wages and salaries; salary hikes (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007); 
rewards in the form of bonuses, honors, promotions, commendations (Khan, Farooq, & 
Ullah, 2010); in-service trainings (Manzoor, 2012); conducive work environment; 
incentives in the forms of loans, medical facility, free accommodation, allowances; and 
interesting work (Kelechi, 2013). 
Similarly, studies on motivations in compliance behavior showed different 
sources of motivation. Winter and May (2001) investigated the sources of motivations for 
the Danish farmers in complying with social and environmental regulations. They found 
that farmers comply with standards due to the fear of detection of violation and 
punishment for them; feeling of civic duty and social pressure to compliance, which 
constitutes the calculated, normative, and social motivations for compliance.  
Feldman, in year 2010, reviewed approaches to regulatory compliance and 
identified five models of regulatory compliance based on distinct individual motivations: 
(1) calculative or incentive-driven individuals, based on a cost-benefit calculations, (2) 
reason-driven individuals, where individuals look for the wisdom of regulators before 
engaging in certain behaviors, (3) social oriented individuals, where individuals focus on 
personal reputation and identity in a social context rather than to obeying laws, (4) 
morality-oriented individuals, where individuals are motivated by morality and fairness, 
and (5) citizenship-oriented individuals, where individuals believe that good citizens 
obey rules irrespective of the content.  
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These sources of motivation to compliance relate well to the different types of 
involvements (alienative, normative, and calculative), discussed in the Etzioni’s 
compliance theory. For example, fear of detection of violation and punishment relate to 
alienative involvement as it could lead to negative commitment; incentive driven relates 
to calculative involvement as it is based on cost-benefit analysis, and commitment could 
range from positive to negative; and feeling of civic duty, morality, and citizenship relate 
to normative involvement since it reiterates the reliability on one’s moral values, and 
could result in positive commitment as proposed in the Etzioni theory.  
Although, the diverse set of motivational sources relates to the three types of 
involvements discussed on Etzioni’s theory, it can be grouped under two motivations 
proposed by Deci (1971), namely the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. The calculative 
and alienative involvement of Etzioni’s theory can be grouped under extrinsic motivation 
as it includes orientations toward money/rewards, recognition, competition, and 
following the dictates of other people (Pierro et al., 2008). In addition, Moss (2016) 
reported that when individuals experience extrinsic motivation, they engage in 
compliance behaviors because of the objective consequences such as tangible rewards or 
punishments. 
 
Extrinsic-intrinsic motivations and complaince 
Banjoko (1996) illustrated that manager’s use money to reward or punish workers 
by instilling fear of loss of job (e.g., premature retirement due to poor performance). It 
was concluded that the desire to be promoted and earn enhanced pay motivates 
employees to perform better. Manzoor (2012) suggested that within organizations money 
is the fundamental inducement, as it has the supremacy to magnetize, maintain and 
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motivate individuals towards higher performance. This was also supported by Du, 
Bhattacharya, and Sen (2007). Ali and Ahmed (2009) showed that businesses use 
bonuses, promotions and other type of rewards to motivate and encourage high level of 
performance of their employees. Milka, Michael, and Tanui (2015) carried out a study to 
determine the effects of different forms of extrinsic motivation, such as working 
conditions, incentives, and interpersonal relations, on employee performance in medium 
class hotels in Kenya. Results revealed that combinations of extrinsic motivation are 
required to ensure effective performance. Finally, researchers concluded that extrinsic 
motivation significantly improves employee performance at work.  
May (2005) analyzed different approaches to regulations and motivations for 
compliance in marine facilities, and their impact on water quality. The study 
demonstrated that deterrent fears (analogous to extrinsic motivation) and the sense of 
duty to comply (equivalent to intrinsic motivation) are important motivations for 
compliance.  
In addition, Babiak & Trendafilova (2010) investigated the motivations and 
pressures for sports organizations in North America to adopt green management 
practices. Data revealed both strategic (extrinsic motivation) and legitimate motives 
(intrinsic motivation) to adopt environmental management practices. However, strategic 
motives were the primary reason for adopting an environmental corporate social 
responsibility focus.  
All the above studies showed that extrinsic motivation enhances participants’ 
commitment to organizational goals. Similarly, in this study it is expected that extrinsic 
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motivation will encourage suppliers in the apparel supply chain to comply with CoC 
standards. Hence, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H3a: Suppliers’ extrinsic motivation positively influences the likelihood of 
compliance.  
   
In educational settings, Ryan, Connell, and Plant (1990) recommended that 
educators typically consider intrinsic motivation to be more desirable than extrinsic 
motivation as they found that the learning outcomes of intrinsic motivation are better than 
those obtained under extrinsic motivation. Lange and Adler (1997) also demonstrated that 
intrinsically motivated students in third grade through fifth grade tend to have higher 
academic self-efficacy, exhibit higher levels of mastery behavior, and have higher 
reading and math achievement. Further, Brown and Shepherd (1997) examined the 
characteristics of librarians’ knowledge base, technical skills, values, and beliefs in 
achieving educational goals. Findings showed librarians who are motivated by deeply 
held values and beliefs succeeded in achieving goals.  
In the organizational setting, Zhang and Wu (2004) indicated that job security 
gives employees a confidence about their future career, and reduces employees’ mental 
tensions. This encourages employees to make greater efforts to achieve the objectives of 
the organization. Consequently, job security adds to overall job satisfaction and is hence 
considered to be the most inﬂuential tool of motivation that leads to proﬁt maximization. 
Towards this end, Grawitch and Barber (2009) posited that internally satisfied, delighted 
and motivated employees are more productive and contribute to profit maximization. 
Further, Chowdhury (2009) examined the importance of positive motivational behavior 
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of the supervisors in enhancing salespeople’s motivation and work performance. The 
findings revealed that supervisors’ positive motivational behaviors induce salespersons’ 
intrinsic motivations, which, in turn, increases salespersons’ performance.  
Jung and Kim (2012) found that good work environment and working conditions 
increase employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Consequently, 
employees give their best efforts, which increase their work performance. Mahazril'Aini, 
et al. (2012) pointed out employee recognition enhances the level of productivity and 
performance at the job whether it is a ﬁrst time performance or a repeated action at the 
job in a progressive way, and ultimately reinforces the behavior of employees. Manzoor’s 
(2012) study on analyzing the impact of employee empowerment and recognition 
programs, reported a positive impact of such programs on employee performance. 
Finally, Kurana’s (2015) study testing variables of intrinsic motivation concluded five 
variables: enjoyment, inherent satisfaction, autonomy, interest, and competence. 
Therefore, the above studies demonstrate that generating intrinsic motivation encourages 
organizational commitment, productivity, and profits. In a similar vein, in the apparel 
buyer-supplier compliance relationship it is anticipated that suppliers’ intrinsic 
motivation will enhance suppliers’ commitment to buyers’ demands, and hence will be 
more compliant. Thus, it is speculated that: 
 
H3b: Suppliers’ intrinsic motivation positively influences the likelihood of  
        compliance.  
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Summary of Research Hypotheses  
Through the literature review, the following five hypotheses were formulated for 
conducting this study and Figure 1 shows the conceptual model and research hypotheses:   
H1a(b): Apparel buyers’ hard (soft) power strategies are positively associated with 
Indian apparel suppliers’ extrinsic (intrinsic) motivation. 
 H2a(b): Apparel buyers’ hard (soft) power strategies are negatively associated with 
Indian apparel suppliers’ intrinsic (extrinsic) motivation. 
H3a, b & c: Suppliers’ extrinsic motivation positively influences suppliers’ monitoring, 
enforcement and transparency engagement levels. 
H4a, b &c: Suppliers’ intrinsic motivation positively influences monitoring, enforcement 
and transparency engagement levels. 
 
Figure 1. Research conceptual model and research hypotheses adopted from compliance 
theory model (Etzioni, 1975) and social power theory (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 
1998).  
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  CHAPTER III. METHODS 
This chapter contain following sections: (a) research method, (b) survey design,  
(c) preliminary test, (d) data collection, and (e) data analysis. 
Research Method  
A quantitative study is designed to provide researcher with an opportunity to test 
conceptual framework (Du et al., 2007).  Further, it is associated with exploring 
connections between variables (Bryman & Bell, 2007), and in determining relationship 
between them (Punch , 2003).  Specifically, survey has been a popular method for data 
collection in the social, behavioral and consumer sciences (Weber & Bradley, 2006). 
Survey research is used widely by government bodies, businesses, academicians, 
politicians and numerous other decision makers to collect information, generate 
knowledge, and draw conclusions (Lavrakas, 2008). This study is aimed to investigate 
business practices and to empirically test effect of the buyers’ power strategies on 
supplier’s motivation and their engagement in CoC compliance mechanisms in an Indian 
apparel industry. Therefore, a quantitative survey was administered for data collection. 
Data was specifically collected via face-to-face surveys, as it offered several advantages.  
 
Face-to-face surveys are clearly structured, flexible and adaptable. They are based 
on personal interaction and can be controlled within the survey environment. In addition, 
these surveys are least burdensome for the respondents, as it require the respondents to 
have only basic verbal and listening skills. Presence of an interviewer can increase 
response rates, maintain respondents’ motivation even with longer questionnaires, probe 
for responses, clarify ambiguous questions, help respondents with enlarged show cards of 
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response choice options, use memory jogging techniques for aiding recall of events and 
behavior, and control the order of the questions (Bowling, 2005). Possible disadvantages 
could be associated high cost, geographical limitations and time pressure on respondents 
(Alreck & Settle, 2004).  
Survey Design  
Face-to-face survey instruments were developed from existing scales published 
previously. It ensured clarity of responses and reliability. Survey instrument was 
designed for respondents from national capital region of Delhi, India. In India, education 
at most of the schools, colleges, and universities is provided in English language (Joseph, 
2014). In today’s Indian market, careers in the field of science and technology, business 
and commerce, require good knowledge of English (Thorpe, 2014). Hence, it is believed 
that managerial positions in the firms were given to those individuals that have 
undergone higher education, and have good knowledge of English language. Therefore, 
survey instrument was prepared in English language only. Further, personnel conducting 
face-to-face interviews were briefed on the objectives of survey, thus were helpful to 
respondents in understanding context of the questions. 
Survey consisted of four parts measuring (a) buyers’ power strategies using the 
Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI) developed by Raven, Schwarzwald, and Koslowsky 
(1998); (b) suppliers’ motivation, using the shorter version of Work Preference Inventory 
(WPI) developed by Robinson et al. (2014); (c) monitoring and enforcement, using CoC 
compliance scale devised by Kolk and Tulder (2002); and (d) transparency using scale 
devised by Dapok (2012).  
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Explanatory Variables 
Power strategies. 
 One of the predominant typologies in social power research is given by French 
and Raven’s power bases (Raven, 1959; and 1965). It categorizes power into six bases:  
coercive, reward, legitimate, expert, referent, and informational powers. Later, Raven 
(1992) extended power bases in the interpersonal power interaction model (IPIM), which 
classified six bases of power into eleven different power strategies, each having three 
items, thus totaling to 33 items.  
 In year 1998, Raven and colleagues grouped eleven power strategies of the IPIM 
into two underlying components: hard and soft power strategies. They proposed that 
‘conceptualization of power bases at a higher level of abstraction may give a better 
understanding of the observed relationships in Raven’s 1992 taxonomy’ (p. 312). 
Proposed hypothesis was tested to operationalize eleven power bases by developing a 
new scale. Their study showed that IPIM was a reliable and valid instrument for 
assessing different bases of power attributed to supervisors in influencing subordinates 
with Cronbach’s alphas for different power bases ranging between .83 to .90 (Raven et 
al., 1998). Satisfactory internal consistency of IPIM was obtained for items comprising 
each of the eleven social power bases, as observed in two different sets of respondents. 
Researchers found an underlying structure of harsh and soft factors extracted from eleven 
power bases. The hard-soft distinction concurred with findings by other researchers 
(Kipnis, 1984; Yukl & Falbe, 1991). Further, individuals across cultures, positions, and 
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gender conceptualized similar bases within each category, indicating that these constructs 
are valid (Raven et al., 1998). 
Using this scale, Pierro et al. (2008) conducted a study to test the motivated 
compliance empirically with eleven bases of social power under two underlying 
components of hard and soft power strategies. The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
showed that the data were consistent with a measurement model. Reliability was 
satisfactory with Cronbach’s alpha .95 and .93 for hard and soft strategies, respectively. 
In 2012, Pierro et al., conducted another study on the bases of social power, leadership 
styles and organizational commitment to compute a hard and a soft power bases category. 
Both, hard (Cronbach’s alpha .91) and soft (Cronbach’s alpha .91) categories of power 
bases were found to be reliable. Consistent with prior researches on social power, 
Belanger et al. (2015) computed a score of compliance with hard and soft power tactics 
with Cronbach’s alpha .93 and .86, respectively. 
 Considering the reliability and validity of instrument developed by Raven et al. 
(1998) for assessing supervisors’ power strategies in influencing subordinates, it was 
selected to examine suppliers’ willingness to comply with hard or soft bases of power 
used by their buyers. Although, original instrument contains 33-items (3-items for each 
power strategy), Pierro et al. (2012) reported 11-items (one item for each power strategy) 
as their representative items. In addition, given that the 33-item would take a long time 
for respondents to complete and may deter participants from paying due attention to all 
survey questions, Robinson et al. (2014) argued that researchers must be cautious with 
the number of questions asked in a survey.  In this light, 11-representative items were 
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used for studying the effect of buyers’ hard and soft power strategies. Pre-test of this 
scale was conducted to ensure its reliability.  
The 11-item IPI scale was presented to the participants with the following 
introductory statement to provide an appropriate context of the study: 
Often buyers ask suppliers to comply with their code of conduct (CoC) 
policies while giving contract to them. Sometimes suppliers resist doing so 
or do not follow buyers’ directions exactly. Other times, they will do 
exactly as their buyers’ request. We are interested in those situations 
which lead suppliers to follow requests of their buyers. Please indicate 
how likely each descriptive statement below would represent a reason for 
complying with your buyers' CoCs. 
 (Above statement was adopted from IPI original scale with italicized 
words indicating modifications made for this study). 
 
Participants were then presented with the 11-item questionnaire (e.g., “Our buyers 
probably knows the best way of achieving compliance”) representing 11-power bases 
delineated by the IPI. Participants were asked to indicate how likely each descriptive 
statement represents a reason for complying with their buyers’ request(s). Participants 
rated the statement on a scale ranging from 1 (definitely not a reason) to7 (definitely a 
reason). The full list of items is presented in Table 2. Necessary modifications to the 
scale, after the preliminary test, were made. 
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Motivations 
 
The Work Preference Inventory (WPI) scale measures motivation in people 
towards work (Stuhlfaut, 2010). WPI was used to assess individual differences in the 
degree to which adults perceive themselves to be intrinsically and extrinsically motivated 
in work situations’ (Amabile et al. 1994).  This scale was initially evaluated by testing on 
a sample of students and working adults. Since its development WPI scale had been used 
to analyze motivation of professional artists (Amabile, 1996), students (Brownlow, 
Gilbert, & Reasinger, 1997; Conti 2001; Moneta & Siu, 2002; Moneta, 2004), and 
business personnel (Malka & Chatman 2003). 
WPI is a 30-item, self-report-inventory (Amabile et al., 1994) administered with a 
4-point scale ranging from 1 (never or almost never true for my factory) to 4 (always or 
almost always true for my factory) to rate the degree to which each item described their 
motivation for compliance. Inventory has two domains: intrinsic motivation, which deals 
with two sub-factors namely, enjoyment (10 items) and challenge (5 items); and extrinsic 
motivation that addresses two other sub-factors, outward orientation (10 items) and 
compensation (5 items). Of the total 30 items of WPI, 15 items relate to intrinsic 
motivation and remaining 15 items represent extrinsic motivation. The intrinsic 
motivation scales were built on five underlying constructs: self-determination, 
competence, task involvement, curiosity and interest. The extrinsic motivation scales 
were built on five other constructs: evaluation, recognition, competition, rewards, and 
control (Stuhlfaut, 2010). In a sample of college students and alumni, Amabile et al. 
(1994) had reported adequate internal consistency for the WPI subscales with Cronbach’s 
alpha .79 for intrinsic and .78 for extrinsic motivation. Similar level of internal 
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consistency was observed in a sample of college students, when put under a 12-month 
cycle of test and retests with Cronbach’s alpha .79 for reliability, and .79 for intrinsic 
subscale (Byrd, Hageman, & Belle Isle, 2007).  
Robinson et al. (2014) developed a shortened, valid and reliable version of the 
WPI. They conducted an exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (EFA and CFA) to 
reduce number of the items. EFA revealed that four sub-factors were roughly equivalent 
to those of the original scale. Cronbach’s alpha for the two domains, intrinsic and 
extrinsic, ranged from .68 to .76. As factors in the WPI with 10-items were strongly and 
significantly associated with factors in the original WPI, it indicates a strong validity of 
the shortened measure. In addition, the 10-items WPI scale showed evidence for similar 
validity, and reliability as the original instrument, while reducing respondents’ burden to 
answer several questions. Therefore, the 10-items WPI scale (Robinson et al., 2014) was 
used for this study. The full list of items is presented in Table 2. Necessary modifications 
to the scale, after the preliminary test, were made. 
 
Outcome Variable 
 
Reich and Samet (1996) identified three components of compliance mechanism: 
monitoring, enforcement, and transparency. They were used in different other studies 
(Kolk & Tulder, 2002; Eggert & Helm, 2003; Lazarus & McManus, 2006; and Lloyd et 
al., 2010). These three components were considered as the key parameters in determining 
suppliers’ level of engagement in compliance with CoC policies, and therefore were 
selected as main constructs measuring level of suppliers’ engagement in managing CoC 
compliance mechanism. Monitoring and enforcement were measured by the scale 
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developed by Kolk and Tulder (2002) and transparency by the scale devised by Dapko 
(2012).  
 
Monitoring.  
Monitoring was conceptualized as the collection of information and its 
verification. It is to check whether the information acquired is accurate, complete, 
relevant, and reliable. It was achieved by examining monitoring systems and processes, 
and position of monitoring.  
Kolk and Tulder (2002) categorized monitoring systems and processes as ‘none’, 
if the monitoring system and processes does not exist; ‘vague’, if codes give no details 
other than monitoring will take place; ‘vague to clear’, when only some parts of the 
monitoring process are referred, however criteria for the assessment or specific time 
frames are lacking; and ‘clear’, when a code gives a good insight into the monitoring 
process and system, including criteria for the assessment and its existence is well known. 
In this study the monitoring systems and processes categories were converted into a 
continuous variable by asking participants to respond on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ‘1’ 
being strongly disagree to ‘5’ strongly agree. Specific questions like “My factory’s CoCs 
give no specific details other than monitoring will take place” were asked. 
The credibility and effectiveness of code was directly related to the independence 
of the monitoring actor, which was referred as the position of monitoring in this study. 
Kolk and Tulder (2002) suggested that an independent monitoring party increases 
suppliers’ compliance with CoC policies. Therefore, participants were asked to respond 
to questions like “My factory conducts monitoring through external professional 
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auditors”. The response was collected on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ‘1’ being strongly 
disagree to ‘5’ being strongly agree.  
Enforcement. 
Enforcement refers to firms’ reaction to CoC violations. Inclusion of sanctions in 
codes may deter firms from breaking their commitment and complying to the set 
standards (Kolk & Tulder, 2002). Sanctions can vary greatly in gravity. To measure 
sanctions, Kolk and Tulder used four categories: ‘none’, when no sanctions are applied; 
‘mild’, when sanctions have no large implications for firms, such as warning and 
exclusion of certain membership; ‘severe’, when business activities threaten to be 
terminated in case of non-compliance. In this study, participants were asked to respond 
on a 5-point Likert-type scale, from ‘1’ being least likely to receive sanctions to ‘5’ being 
most likely to receive sanctions. An example of the question asked from the participant is 
“My factory does not receive any sanction in case of non-compliance.” 
Transparency. 
The transparency scale was developed by Dapok (2012). Cronbach’s alpha for 
this scale was .98, and hence considered reliable. Scale consists of 7-items, administered 
with 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from ‘1’ (strongly disagree) to ‘7’ (strongly agree). 
The full list of suppliers’ engagement in managing CoC compliance mechanism items is 
available in Table 2. A modification to the scale, after the preliminary test, was done. 
 
Demographic information.   
Lastly, demographic information of the participants, such as age, gender, years of 
experience, educational backgrounds, company location, product category, company 
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clients, total number of employees, and annual sales volume, were collected. The 
demographic information helped to provide a contextual description of the participants.  
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1 
Table 2. Survey Constructs, Measurement item, Sources, and Reliabilities 
 
Construct: Buyer’s Power Strategies 
 
Dimensions 
Source 
Cronbach’s alpha 
 
Scale items 
Hard 
Power 
Strategies 
(7 items) 
Raven, 
Schwarzwald, and 
Koslowsky (1998) 
.83 to .90  
HP-1Our buyers could help us get new contracts. 
HP-2 My factory liked our buyers, and their approval is important to us. 
HP-3 Our buyer could make it more difficult for us to get new contracts. 
HP-4 Just knowing that our factory is on the bad list of the buyers   
          would upset us.  
HP-5 As a supplier, my factory had an obligation to do as my buyers  
         have said. 
HP-6 My factory had made some mistakes and therefore felt that we  
         owed compliance to our buyers. 
HP-7 Due to the past contracts my factory had received, we feel obliged to 
comply. 
 
Soft Power 
Strategies 
(4 items) 
Raven, 
Schwarzwald, and 
Koslowsky (1998) 
.83 to .90 
SP-1 My factory realized that buyer needs assistance and cooperation  
         from those working with them.  
SP-2 My factory see our buyers as someone we could identify with. 
SP-3 Our buyers probably know the best way of achieving compliance. 
SP-4 Whenever our buyer request changes, my factory could see why  
         the change was necessary. 
 
Note: Italicized words shows modifications from the original instrument.
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Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Construct: Supplier’s Motivations 
 
Dimensions             
 
Source 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Scale items 
 
Intrinsic 
motivation 
(5 items) 
 
Robinson et al., 
(2014) 
.71 - .76 
IM-1 My factory enjoy tackling problems that are completely new to us. 
IM-2 My factory enjoy solving complex problems. 
IM-3 The more difficult the problem, the more enthusiastically our factory tries to solve it. 
IM-4 What matters most to our factory is enjoying what we do. 
IM-5 It is important for our factory to be able to do what we most enjoy. 
 
Extrinsic 
motivation 
(5 items) 
Robinson et al., 
(2014) 
.69 - .75 
EM-1 My factory is strongly motivated by the recognition we can earn  
          from other factories by being compliant. 
EM-2 My factory want other buyers to find out how good we really can be  
          at achieving compliance. 
EM-3 To our factory, success means doing better than other factories.  
EM-4 My factory is keenly aware of the promotional goals we have for  
           ourselves. 
EM-5 My factory is keenly aware of the income goals we have for ourselves. 
 
 
Note: Italicized words shows modifications from the original instrument.
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Construct: Suppliers’ Engagement Level in Compliance Mechanism 
Dimensions 
Source 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Scale items 
 
Monitoring 
(7 items) 
Kolk & Tulder 
(2002) 
Not reported 
 
M-1 Monitoring system exist in my factory. 
M-2 My factory’s CoCs give no specific details other than monitoring will take place. (R) 
M-3 Some part of the monitoring process is referred in my factory CoCs,  
        however specific criteria for assessment or time frames are lacking.(R)  
M-4 My factory’s CoCs give a good insight into the monitoring process and  
        system, including the criteria for assessment. 
M-5 The existence of my factory’s monitoring system is well known. 
M-6 My factory conduct monitoring only by themselves. (R) 
M-7 My factory conduct monitoring through external professional auditors. 
M-8 My factory conduct monitoring through independent bodies such as, legal authorities, 
social interest groups, non-government organizations and business support groups. 
Enforcement 
(4 items) 
Kolk & Tulder 
(2002) 
Not reported 
 
E-1 My factory does not receive any sanction in case of non-compliance. (R) 
E-2 Buyers’ sanction does not have any large implications on our factory, such as,  
       warning and exclusion of certain membership. (R) 
E-3 Upon non-compliance by our factory, buyers threaten to terminate the  
       business contracts. 
E-4 My factory has provisions of sanctioning third parties/suppliers or sub-contractors for 
non-compliances. 
. 
 
Note: Italicized words shows modifications from the original instrument.
  
 
5
4 
Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Construct: Engagement Level in Compliance Mechanism 
Transparency 
(7 items) 
Dapok (2012) 
.98 
T-1 My factory is willing to share information with stakeholders even when it may make the       
       company look bad.  
T-2 My factory provides stakeholders with a learning opportunity about itself. 
T-3 My factory enables stakeholders to know what we are doing. 
T-4 My factory is willing to explain its decisions to the stakeholders. 
T-5 My factory is willing to share just about any information stakeholders request from it. 
T-6 My factory wants stakeholders to understand what we are doing. 
T-7 My factory is open to sharing information stakeholders. 
 
Note: Italicized words shows modifications from the original instrument.
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Preliminary Test  
According to Dillman (2000), pretesting is administering a survey to individuals 
with special knowledge of the topic or similar members of the survey population, asking 
them to complete the survey, and to report any problems experienced. Preliminary testing 
of the study’s survey instrument was performed to help ensure content validity and scale 
reliability. Therefore, prior to collecting data, survey instrument was pretested to refine 
and modify.  Feedback on the survey draft from at least fifteen individuals with 
specialized knowledge was obtained. Five professors working in the field of textile and 
apparel management, and ten graduate students or related professionals having Indian 
apparel industry work experience of at least one year reviewed preliminary survey 
instrument. This was done to determine the time required to complete the survey 
(approximately 15-20 minutes), to seek feedback on the format and content of survey 
items, to refine wording and ensure clarity of the questions, and to identify any 
navigation problems.  
The results of preliminary testing showed that in general the survey questions and 
scales were comprehendible, with few exceptions. First, the buyers’ power strategy scale 
was reported as confusing and recommended to be changed. Therefore, scale for 
measuring buyers’ hard and soft power strategies was modified from 7-point scale 
(definitely not a reason to definitely a reason) to 5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to 
strongly agree). Second, it was advised to simplify survey item #4 (“my factory’s CoCs 
give a good insight into the monitoring process and system, including the criteria for 
assessment and its existence is well known”) in the level of engagement to monitoring as 
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was found to be double barreled. Thus, original item#4 was changed to two items: item#4 
“my factory’s CoCs give a good insight into the monitoring process and system, 
including the criteria for assessment” and item#5 “the existence of my factory’s 
monitoring system is well known”. Finally, item#4 “My factory has provisions of 
sanctioning third parties or sub-contractors” in the level of engagement to enforcement 
was restated as the item was not clear. More details were added to item#4 (“my factory 
has provisions of sanctioning third parties or sub-contractors for non-compliances”). 
 After incorporating suggested changes in the questionnaire, survey was sent to 
the NextGen for pilot testing. Pilot testing questionnaires with small groups help to 
identify problems that were not obvious to the researcher, such as issues causing low 
response rate, entire pages or sections being skipped, questions not being answered, and 
items not correlating in a way that allows scales to be built (Needham & Vaske, 2008). 
For pilot testing, survey was administered to a relatively small number of participants 
representing sample population. For this purpose, researcher collected data of the first 21 
participants (10% of the sample in this study) from NextGen. This sample size for pilot 
testing was based on the observation of Baker (1994), who recommended 10–20% of the 
total sample as a reasonable number of participants to consider for pilot testing. Data 
collected was downloaded and checked for completeness of responses. No further 
inconsistency in the survey questionnaire was found. Therefore, same questionnaire 
survey was administered to all the target participants.   
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Data Collection  
Sample Frame 
 
According to the Apparel Export Promotion Council (AEPC) in 2009, there were 
seven major apparel clusters in India. These are Delhi, Jaipur and Ludhiana in the North, 
Calcutta in the East, Mumbai in the West, and Chennai, Bangalore and Tirupur in the 
South of India. Of the three apparel clusters in northern India, Delhi focuses on ladies 
wear production, Jaipur is renowned for hand-block printing, and Ludhiana is a woolen 
garment center (Mezzadri, 2014). Delhi, along with Tirupur and Bangalore, contributes to 
approximately 60% of all India garment apparel exports (Bhullar, Singh , & Sabharwal, 
2015).  
The apparel industry in national capital region (NCR) of Delhi, India, is spread 
across Okhla, in the state of Delhi; Noida, in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP); and 
Gurgaon, Faridabad, in Haryana state (Bhullar, Singh , & Sabharwal, 2015). Apparel 
industry in Delhi is predominantly export driven, about 83% of the total production is 
exported, catering primarily to the international market and some local markets within the 
country.  
In Delhi (NCR), the average industrial size of apparel factories is much smaller 
than in other apparel clusters and industrial fragmentation dominate, as most apparel 
factories own multiple units across the NCR rather than the single-integrated industrial 
set-ups (Singh & Kaur Sapra, 2007). In addition, Delhi’s apparel industry is multilayered, 
and consists of complex industrial clusters. In apparel cluster, production is organized in 
different layers, and units’ type varies from industrial, formal and informal, factory-based 
and non-factory-based, workshop and home-based units. As social compliance initiatives 
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in Delhi have relatively been unsuccessful (Mezzadri, 2014), the apparel exporter firms in 
Delhi NCR provides an ideal context to investigate buyer-supplier compliance 
relationship in the apparel industry context. Therefore, apparel manufacturing/exporting 
firms’ factories based in Delhi NCR were chosen for the study’s sample frame. One 
respondent from each factory was selected, as a representative, to conduct this study. 
The National People’s Tribune (2012) reported that approximately 1675 apparel 
manufacturing units are registered and operates in NCR. The database of the registered 
apparel manufacturing factories in Delhi, which are recognized by the Directorate 
General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of 
India, was accessed to decide on the sample frame for the study. 
Sampling  
To conduct this study, an approval from the Institutional Review Board, 
University of Missouri-Columbia was obtained (Appendix B). A market research firm, 
NexGen Market Research Services Pvt. Ltd. (NextGen), based in New Delhi, India, was 
hired to recruit participants and conduct survey for the study (Appendix C). NextGen 
offers high quality marketing research, analysis and consulting services across the world. 
Researchers involved in the study provided a detailed protocol to the NexGen team leader 
containing guidelines to follow while collecting the survey responses. An online briefing 
session was conducted between the principal investigator and the NexGen team leaders, 
besides close monitoring via frequent communication was established to ensure clarity of 
the protocol and high quality of the data.  
Due to the difficult-to-reach population of the sample, purposive sampling 
technique was used. Purposive sampling techniques are based on the knowledge of a 
 59 
 
 
population and purpose of the study. A limitation with purposive sampling technique may 
be its representativeness to a population, which may affect external validity (Jupp, 2006). 
To overcome this issue, screening questions were added on the survey to ensure that 
nature of the firms’ selected was consistent during sampling and participants’ work 
experience relates to the study objectives. 
Becker-Blease (2010) used four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) 
codes while analyzing production technology of manufacturing firms within a given 
industry from United States to keep the sample size homogeneous in order to account for 
diversity. However, no such industry classification system exists in India. Therefore, in 
this study, to ensure sample homogeneity, Indian apparel manufacturing firms that are 
exporting apparels only to the developed countries were selected for the study and screen 
questions were added to the survey. First screening question was, “Do you work in 
apparel manufacturing firm that export clothing/apparels to a developed country?” Only 
if participant chooses “yes,” they were requested to complete next question related to 
their work experience. 
To study management systems and practices used in the implementation of CoC 
in global supply chains in sports footwear, apparel and retail sectors; Mamic (2003) 
conducted interviews at the production, compliance, health and safety, and human 
resource managerial levels, along with company directors and/or owners of the supplier 
factory. In addition, Sui and Lam (2008) suggested that plant managers play an important 
role in implementing ethical practices within a firm. Jaiswal and Ha-Brookshire (in 
review, 2017) also found company owners, compliance officers, production managers, 
and human resource managers as an appropriate sample in exploring CoC 
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implementation practices in the Indian apparel export houses. Therefore, only those 
personnel involved in the management of compliance related activities within a firm were 
recruited as the study participant. To ensure this, a second screening question was added, 
“Are you in any compliance managerial capacity within your factory?”  If the participants 
choose “yes,” they were asked to specify their current position in the factory and years of 
their association with it.  
During spring of 2017 data was collected by NextGen. Collected data was 
transferred to principal investigator weekly, and exported to Microsoft Excel. A scan 
copy of all completed survey forms was also provided to the investigators. Recruitment 
messages were kept specific with detailed information on how to participate in the study 
and access survey (see Appendix A). NextGen team sent consent form along with project 
brief via email to the participants and appointments were fixed in advance with the 
potential participants.  
At the conclusion of the data collection period, a total of 210 usable survey 
responses were obtained by NextGen. In this study, there were 40 parameters and 7 latent 
variables. The rule-of-thumb given by Bentler and Chou (1987) suggests 5 or 10 
observations per estimated parameter for calculating the sample size for conducting SEM 
analysis. Based on this calculation sample size of 200 deemed appropriate. Further, the 
power analysis of 200 sample size was calculated using ‘computing power and minimum 
sample size for RMSEA’ software developed by Preacher and Coffman (2006). 
Additionally, power analysis was conducted with 849 df, alternate RMSEA of .08, null 
RMSEA of .05, and Cronbach’s alpha of .05. A power of .98 was achieved for the sample 
size of 200. 
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Data Analysis 
Assessment of Basic Assumptions 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 21.0 by IBM was used 
for data analysis. Data was transferred from Excel worksheet and subjected to cleaning, 
coding and organizing for further analysis. A preliminary analysis was conducted for 
descriptive statistics, and for checking assumptions such as missing data, outliers, 
multicollineraity, and normality. Results of the preliminary testing and assumption 
checking are discussed in Chapter IV. 
Scale Reliability and Validity 
Following verification of the assumptions, assessment of reliability and validity of 
the developed scales was conducted. Reliability deals with the consistency of a measure 
or the extent to which a measure is repeatable (Nunnally, Bernstein, & Berge, 1967). 
Reliability is of particular importance as it establishes validity. To assess reliability in this 
study, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated by SPSS.  
Convergent validity, along with discriminant validity, is a subtype of construct 
validity. It was assessed by calculating composite reliability (CR) indicative of the 
amount of shared variance between latent construct measurement items. CR based 
calculations are relatively superior to average variance extracted (AVE) (Malhotra & 
Dash, 2011, p.702). Hence, in this study, CR was used for validity testing. Results of the 
scale reliability and validity checks are discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
Model Testing 
To test hypotheses about relationships among observed and latent variables, Structure 
Equation Modeling (SEM) was conducted, as it is a comprehensive statistical approach 
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(Hoyle, 1995). SEM technique allows simultaneous testing of all relationships in one 
model, leading to a better understanding of relationships among different components 
(Johnson & Greening, 1999). SEM was conducted using Mplus software to run 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and test causal models, following two-step approach, 
as described by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). Measurement model was assessed first, 
followed by an estimation of the structural relationships that existed among latent 
variables in the measurement model.  
Assessment of the measurement model. 
In order to develop a measurement model, each latent construct was first 
associated with its a priori respective measurement item. Next, measurement model was 
assessed for the model fit. This assessment involves observing fit statistics associated 
with the measurement model of the latent constructs and their respective measurement 
items. The Goodness of fit exists when the p-value associated with the χ2 (Chi-squared) 
statistic is > .10; when the Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), 
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) are all > .90; and, when the 
RMSEA Index is < .06 (Hu & Bentler, 1995). Among these, CFI and RMSEA are 
frequently reported fit indices (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013), and were used in this study.  
If the model fit is poor, it is necessary to explore whether adding or deleting certain paths 
(theoretically justified) will enhance model fit. It is important to note that item deletion, 
unless the research is mainly exploratory, should be done with some theoretical 
justification (Hu & Bentler, 1995). A point of reference in item deletion is the 
Modification Indices or the Standardized Residuals, which can provide an indication 
whether deletion of a particular item will lead to the improvement of fit. Model was then 
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theoretically justified to enhance its fitness by modifying (addition or deletion) 
components of certain paths. Deletion for theoretical justification was done in accordance 
with previously established criterion (Hu & Bentler, 1995). Results of the measurement 
model are discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
Assessment of the structural model. 
 
To measure structural relationship between latent variables a hypothesized casual 
model was developed. This model was assessed for the goodness of fit. To achieve 
goodness of fit, an a priori theoretical justification was made by exploring possibilities of 
addition or deletion of certain paths. The direction and magnitude of the path coefficients 
were finally inspected. This approach was adopted from Anderson and Gerbing (1988). 
Results of the structural model assessment are detailed in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents details of the procedures used and results of the study. It 
contains following sections: (a) demographic description of the study sample, (b) 
assessment of basic assumptions, (c) scale reliability and validity (d) confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA), (e) structural equation modeling (SEM) for hypothesis testing. 
 
Demographic Description of the Study Sample  
 
During spring of 2017, from the face-to-face surveys collected by market research 
company, NextGen, 210 were deemed complete and useable for the purpose of the 
present study. Majority of participants were male (89.5%). Educational background 
analysis revealed that majority of participants had Bachelor’s level education (51.4%), 
followed by post graduate degrees (37.1%), while none had less than high school level of 
education.  
Manufacturing units’ product portfolio was found to include multiple apparel 
products categories. Of the 210 participants, 191 (91%) produces women’s clothing, 138 
(65.7%) manufactures men’s clothing, 97 (46.2%) produces children’s clothing, 21 (10%) 
were involved in active wear  production, while 33 (69.3%) manufactured other textile 
products such as towels, bedsheets, kitchen apparels, curtains, and fashion accessories. 
Products manufactured by the participating factories were exported to multiple 
continents. Of the total participants, 157 (74.7%) exported their products to Europe, 108 
(51.4%) to North America, 194 (92.4%) to Asia, 57 (72.1%) to Australia and 24 (11.8%) 
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to other countries, such as Latin America, Canada, Middle East, and UAE. Table 3 
compiles categorical demographic information. 
 
Table 3 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants and their Factories (n=210). 
Variable Description n Percent 
Participants    
 
Gender 
 
Male 
Female 
 
 
188 
22 
 
89.5% 
10.5% 
Level of education Less than high school 
High school diploma 
College degree or Bachelor’s degree 
Post-Graduate degree  
Doctorate degree  
 
0 
23 
108 
78 
1 
 
0% 
11% 
51.4% 
37.1% 
.5% 
Factories 
 
   
Factory’s product 
category
1
  
           
Men’s clothing 
Women’s clothing 
Children’s clothing 
Active wear 
Other textile products 
 
138/210 
191/210 
97/210 
21/210 
33/210 
65.7% 
91% 
46.2% 
10% 
69.3% 
Continents the factory 
export
1
  
 
 
Europe 
North America 
Asia 
Australia 
Other 
157/210 
108/210 
194/210 
57/210 
24/210 
74.8% 
51.4% 
92.4% 
27.1% 
11.8% 
 
 
  Note: 
1
Participants were asked to choose more than one option if appropriate.  
 
Descriptive mean and standard deviation were analyzed for continuous 
demographic characteristic variables. Age of participants ranged from 30 to 68 with the 
mean age between 48 and 49 years old. Total years of participant’s work experience in 
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apparel/clothing manufacturing industry that export ranged from 3 to 51 years, with an 
average of 21 years. Years of work experience with their current factory ranged from 3 to 
47 years, with an average of 18 years. Length in years since company establishment were 
from 3 to 50 years, with a mean of 21 years. Number of employees ranged from 100 to 
900, with a mean of 233 to 234. Total annual sales were reported between Indian Rupees 
(INR) 40 to 2,550 million (equivalent to US $6.36 to 396 million), with an average of 
INR 420 million (equivalent to US $65 million). Table-4 presents the detailed 
demographic information.   
 
Table 4 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants and their Factories (n=210). 
Variable M SD 
 
Participants 
 
  
        Age 
 
48.5 7.7 
        Years of total experience in apparel/clothing    
         manufacturing company that exports 
 
21.1 10.9 
        Years of experiences in the current factory 
 
17.96 9.49 
Factories 
 
  
        Years since factory establishment 
 
21.1 10.9 
        Total number of employees currently employed in the     
        factory 
 
233.71 147.61 
        Annual sale volume (US$, in Million) 65.02 29.44 
 
Note: Current exchange rate is US$1 = INR 64.5 (approximately) 
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Analysis of demographic characteristics of the studied sample indicated that 
majority of the responders were male. Mezzadri (2014) observed that men play a 
significant role in the NCR apparel cluster, which concurs with the results presented here. 
Further, most of the participants indicated that their firm specializes in manufacturing 
women’s apparels, as observed by Bhullar et al. (2015) in NCR. Also, most of the 
respondents were found highly educated, supporting the assumption used while preparing 
survey instrument in English language only. 
Assessment of Basic Assumptions  
Survey results were first transferred to Excel file during data collection from 
NextGen. Data was then transferred to SPSS, with which it was cleaned and organized 
for initial descriptive analysis. Sample was particularly reviewed for any missing data 
point, outliers, multicollinearity, and normality.   
 
Missing Data. There were no missing data points within 210 usable responses. It 
is indicative of the sincerity with which data collection and entry was made by NextGen.    
Outliers. Outliers were assessed by looking for cases where particular responses 
were beyond three standard deviations of the mean, as indicated previously (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2013). Data points were inspected by plotting histograms to compare observed 
values with their distribution. Data is expected to approximate with the normal 
distribution (Hair et al, 2006). Data inspection and standard deviation scores indicated 
few outliers in specific items, however they were not spread consistently across the items. 
For multivariate outliers, Mahalanobis distances from items were calculated, and no 
outlier was detected.  
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Multicollinearity. Multicollinearity was assessed by calculating correlation matrix 
for high-correlation coefficients between predictor variables. Correlation coefficient was 
found to be >.9, which is in confirmation to the value observed by Hair et al. (2006). 
Also, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance measures were used to make 
multicollinearity assessments. VIF for all variables was between 1-3 and tolerance ranged 
between .4 -.5.  VIFs of 10 or higher (or equivalently, tolerances of .10 or less) was used 
as a threshold for detecting multicollinearity, as suggested by Cohen et al. (2013) (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2013). Taken together, multicollinearity was found to be within 
the acceptable limits.  
Normality. Normality assessments were made by measuring skewness, kurtosis 
and the Shapiro-Wilk test for univariate normality. Most of the data points were found to 
have asymmetry and kurtosis values between -2 and +2. These values are considered 
acceptable for normal univariate distribution (George & Mallery, 2010). However, one 
item, Item#M1, showed slight skewness (-2.344; SE=.168) and high kurtosis (8.892; 
SE=.334). Hu and Bentler (1995) recommended keeping an eye on such items and 
consider removing during the modeling fit process if such item affects overall model fit 
significantly.  
 
Scale Reliability and Validity 
An initial screening of the Cronbach’s alpha values of the seven latent variables 
was performed. All values were apparently within the limit of acceptance. However, 
reliability of the soft power strategy was found low (Cronbach alpha = .443). It could be 
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due to the difference in sample population and context. Scale was initially developed and 
tested among student and hospital workers from developed country (Raven, 
Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998). As soft power scale was not found internally reliable 
it was removed from the model. 
 Cronbach’s alpha of the remaining six latent variables, buyers’ hard power 
strategies (Cronbach alpha .650), perceived suppliers’ intrinsic motivation (Cronbach 
alpha .737), supplier’ extrinsic motivation (Cronbach alpha .754), suppliers’ level of 
engagement in monitoring (Cronbach alpha .669), and suppliers’ level of engagement in 
transparency (Cronbach alpha .723) indicated an internal consistency of the respective 
scales. Tavakol (2011) indicated that alpha could be affected by length of the tests or 
number of items testing the concepts. Further, Schmitt (1996) suggested that there is no 
sacred level of acceptable or unacceptable level of alpha. In some cases, even low levels 
of alpha are quite useful. In this study, criteria of Cronbach’s alpha used for establishing 
internal consistency reliability were: excellent (α>.9), good (.7<α<.9), acceptable 
(.6<α<.7), poor (.5<α<.6), and unacceptable (α<.5) (Kline, 2000; George & Mallery, 
2003; and Bhatnagar, Kim, & Many, 2014). At the same time, composite reliabilities 
(CR) are perceived as a stronger reliability assessment criterion and a measure of validity. 
Therefore, CR was calculated for each latent variable. Hair et al (2010) had suggested 
that CR should be at least .6 and preferably higher than .7. Since CR of each latent 
variable was within the suggested criteria, it can be concluded that all of the scales, 
except soft power, used in this study were deemed relatively internally consistent and 
reliable.  
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Model Testing 
 
Following assessment of the basic assumptions, SEM was conducted using two-
step approach (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Psychometric properties, which include 
developing the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) measurement model and assessing 
construct validity, were established. Structural relationships that exist among latent 
variables in the measurement model were measured. 
 
 
Results of Measurement Model.  
Measurement modeling led us to delete four items from the latent variable of hard 
power strategies (items#HP1, HP2, HP5, and HP6). It was realized that these four HP 
items reflected positive strategies, while the remaining three items suggested negative or 
punitive strategies. Further, during model fit process of the latent variable of supplier’s 
level of engagement in monitoring, led us to delete four more items (items#M1, M3, M4, 
M6), including M1 that showed a high kurtosis value previously, and one item from the 
suppliers’ level of engagement in enforcement (item#E2). As items# M3 and M4 were 
already captured by the item M2, these items were found to be repetitive, and hence 
dropped from further analysis. Additionally, four items (items#T3, T4, T6 and T7) from 
the latent variable of transparency were deleted; as these were found to represent the 
items that were already considered in the measurement model. Finally, model fit process 
of the measurement model led us to delete the latent variable of enforcement as it does 
not fit the proposed model.  
Measurement model had good model fit (χ2 = 236.098, df = 142, p = .000, CFI = 
.896, TLI = .874, RMSEA = .056, SRMR = .062), based on cutoff values (i.e., CFI > .90, 
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RMSEA < .06, and SRMR < .08), as suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999). Next, factor 
loadings were assessed. All factor loadings were positive, with values >.4, and 
statistically significant, supporting convergent validity (Anderson & David, 1991). 
Results of the measurement model are reported in Table-5. 
 
 
Table 5  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Measurement Model, and Scale Reliabilities (n=210).  
 
 
Constructs 
Item Standardized 
Parameter 
Estimates 
(β) 
t-value p-value 
 
 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies 
Cronbach’s Alpha=.650 
Composite Reliability=.641 
 
HP3 
 
.578 
 
9.486 
 
.000 
HP4 .879 14.511 .000 
HP7 .439 6.615 .000 
 
Suppliers’ Intrinsic Motivation 
Cronbach’s Alpha=.737 
Composite Reliability=.745 
 
IM1 
 
.645 
 
11.801 
 
.000 
IM2 .709 13.876 .000 
IM3 .546 8.814 .000 
IM4 .568 9.360 .000 
IM5 .558 9.287 .000 
 
Suppliers’ Extrinsic Motivation 
Cronbach’s Alpha=.754 
Composite Reliability=.757 
EM1 .779 18.604 .000 
EM2 .760 17.792 .000 
EM3 .590 10.767 .000 
EM4 .430 6.577 .000 
EM5 .479 7.630 .000 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Monitoring 
Cronbach’s Alpha=.669 
Composite Reliability=.691 
M2 .491 6.585 .000 
M5 .463 6.322 .000 
M7 .760 10.064 .000 
 
Transparency 
Cronbach’s Alpha=.723 
Composite Reliability=.740 
T1 .814 16.794 .000 
T2 .579 10.163 .000 
T5 .681 13.129 .000 
                                                                                                       Goodness-of-Fit Indices  
                                                                       χ2 = 236.098, df = 142, p = .000, CFI = .896,  
                                                                          TLI = .874, RMSEA = .056, SRMR = .062  
Note: Item numbers with their corresponding survey questionnaire number can be found 
in Appendix D. 
  
 
 
Results of the Structural Model 
Hypothesized relationships were tested through structural modeling. This analysis 
involved assessment of the goodness of fit of the hypothesized model and investigation of 
the significance and direction of the path coefficients. Results showed that the structural 
model had good model fit (χ2 = 232.225, df = 143, p= .000, CF= .901, TLI = .882, 
RMSEA = .055, SRMR = .069), in agreement with the cutoff values suggested by Hu and 
Bentler (1999). Structural model analysis supported most of the hypothesis proposed in 
the present study. Only exceptions were hard power on intrinsic motivation (H1); and 
intrinsic motivation on monitoring (H4a). Figure 2 and Table 6 presents structural model 
and its standardized path estimates, t-values, and p-values, along with the goodness of 
model fit indices.  
 73 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Results of all hypotheses tested for investigating effect of buyers’ power 
strategies on suppliers’ motivation and their level of engagement in managing CoC 
compliance mechanisms (*** represent p-value <.05; β represent standardized parameter 
estimates).  
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Table 6  
Structural Model’s Parameter Estimates, t-Values, and Significance Levels (n=210). 
 
 
Paths in the Model 
Standardized 
Parameter 
Estimates (β) 
t-value p-value 
 
Structural Model 
 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies (HP) 
Suppliers’ Extrinsic Motivation (EM) 
 
 
.571 
 
7.968 
 
.000 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies (HP) 
Suppliers’ Intrinsic Motivation (IM) 
 
.032 .325 .745 
Supplier’s Extrinsic Motivation (EM) 
Monitoring (M) 
 
.262 2.758 .006 
Supplier’s Extrinsic Motivation (EM) 
Transparency (T) 
 
.177 2.238 .025 
Supplier’s Intrinsic Motivation (IM) 
Monitoring (M) 
 
.130 1.319 .187 
Supplier’s Intrinsic Motivation (IM) 
Transparency (T) 
 
.463 6.359 .000 
                                                                                       Goodness-of-Fit Indices  
χ2 = 232.225, df = 143, p= .000, CFI= .901,  
TLI = .882, RMSEA = .055, SRMR = .069), 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 and 2. 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1) proposed relationship between buyers’ hard power strategies 
and suppliers’ extrinsic motivation. It was hypothesized that apparel buyers’ hard power 
strategies are positively associated with Indian apparel suppliers’ extrinsic motivation. 
Results indicated that buyers’ hard power strategies did have a significant positive effect 
on suppliers’ extrinsic motivation (Standardized β=.571, p-value <.000), thus supporting 
Hypothesis 1.  
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Previously, researchers had identified several sources of hard power that superiors 
(agents) use in motivating and enhancing subordinates’ performance (Raven et al, 1998; 
Erchul, Raven & Koslowsky, Schwarzwald, & Ashuri, 200; Wilson, 2004). Depending 
on the nature of specific power used, different motivations are induced among 
subordinates depending on their psychological orientation towards money, recognition, 
and dictate of other people (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007; Khan, Farooq, & Ullah, 
2010; Manzoor, 2012; and Kelechi, 2013).  In this study, a positive relationship was 
found between hard power strategies and extrinsic motivation, which concurs with the 
findings of Pierro et al. (2008). In accordance with established point of view, it was 
observed in this study that when buyers relied on the use of hard power strategies, 
specifically those powers that are related to the application of coercion, extrinsic 
motivation was found to be significantly higher in achieving suppliers’ compliance.  
 H2 addressed relationship among buyers’ hard power strategies and suppliers’ 
intrinsic motivation. It was hypothesized that apparel buyers’ hard power strategies are 
negatively associated with Indian apparel suppliers’ intrinsic motivation. Contrarily to 
the hypothesized relationship, findings of the study showed a positive relationship. 
However, the effect was found to be statistically non-significant (p-value >.05). The 
non-significant effect of intrinsic motivation can be explained by the rationale of 
autonomy versus control, as reflected by Deci and Ryan (2000). In the past, researchers 
had analyzed the effect of rewards on intrinsic motivation and demonstrated that reward 
undermines the effect of intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 
1973) as it shifts individual psychological orientation from internal to externally 
perceived locus of causality (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Furthermore, not only tangible 
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rewards, but also threats (Deci & Cascio, 1972), deadlines (Amabile, DeJong, & Lepper, 
1976), directives (Koestner, Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984), and competition pressure 
(Reeve & Deci, 1996) were found to diminish intrinsic motivation because individuals’ 
perceive threats as controllers of their behavior. Similarly, this study found that the hard 
power strategies used by MNEs acted as an external stimulus for suppliers’ to act 
towards compliance; hence the effect of intrinsic motivation might have been 
diminished.  
Hypothesis 3a, b, and c. 
It was hypothesized that extrinsic motivation among apparel suppliers’ positively 
influences their level of engagement in managing suppliers’ CoC compliance 
mechanisms of monitoring, enforcement, and transparency. In particular, it was 
hypothesized that suppliers’ extrinsic motivation has a positive influence on their level of 
engagement in monitoring (H3a), enforcement (H3b), and in maintaining transparency 
(H3c) of CoCs. However, during the assessment of the measurement model, the latent 
variable of enforcement was dropped from the study due to the model fit issues, only two 
hypotheses, H3a and H3c, were tested. 
Analysis of the survey based results in this study indicated that overall extrinsic 
motivation has a statistically significant (p-value< .05) positive effect on both the 
components of suppliers’ compliance mechanisms, monitoring (Standardized β =.262) as 
well as transparency (Standardized β =.177).  
The proposed hypotheses confirmed previous theories on mandatory compliance 
regulatory approach that emphasized on extrinsic motivation in regulating subordinates’ 
(suppliers’ in this study) behavior and enhancing compliance (Babiak & Trendafilova, 
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2010; and Milka, Michael, & Tanui, 2015). Kruglanski (1975) suggested that extrinsic 
motivation is cognitive process where subordinates’ assess work as a means to some 
tangible goals, and have psychological orientation towards money, recognition, 
competition, and dictate of other people (Pierro et al, 2008) . In agreement with previous 
studies, the presented study affirms that as suppliers’ were extrinsically motivated, hence 
the level of suppliers’ engagement in monitoring and transparency of compliance 
mechanisms was high as suppliers’ linked achieving compliance with CoCs as a mean to 
achieve some tangible goals and ends. 
 
Hypothesis 4a, b, and c. 
Three different hypotheses were proposed in this study to understand role of 
intrinsic motivation among apparel suppliers towards their level of engagement in 
managing suppliers’ CoC compliance mechanisms of monitoring, enforcement and 
transparency. In particular, it was hypothesized that suppliers’ intrinsic motivation has an 
effect on their level of engagement in monitoring (H4a), enforcement (H4b), and 
maintaining transparency (H4c) of CoCs. However, as the latent variable of enforcement 
was dropped from the study due to the model fit issues, only two hypotheses, H4a and 
H4c, were tested. 
Analysis of results indicated that intrinsic motivation had a statistically non-
significant effect on suppliers’ level of engagement on monitoring (Standardized β =.130, 
p-value> .05), while a statistically significant effect on transparency (Standardized β 
=.463, p-value< .05). Thus, H4(c) was supported, while H4(a) was not.  
The effect of intrinsic motivation on suppliers’ level of engagement on 
monitoring and transparency could be explained by self-determination theory (SDT) that 
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differentiate motivation on the basis of autonomy and control (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
According to the SDT theory, when motivation is due to control, it is characterized by 
feelings of internal or external pressure/control that conflict with what one would 
otherwise choose, such as avoiding shame, interpersonal rejection, or obtaining external 
rewards. As Arnaud and Chandon (2013) pointed out that monitoring reflect disciplining 
techniques where behavior is controlled in different ways such as supervisor watching 
employees, conducting surveillances, and verifying documents. A non-significant effect 
of intrinsic motivation on monitoring was expected. 
On the other hand, when motivation is characterized by autonomy, behavior is 
regulated by the reasons an individual value, finds meaningful, and wholly endorses 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000). Towards this, Frey (1997) suggested that intrinsic motivation in 
employees could be inculcated through employees’ trust, sense of belongingness, and job 
satisfaction. Wong (2017) emphasized on transparent work practices in developing 
employees’ trust and providing job satisfaction (Wong, 2017). Therefore, significant 
effect of intrinsic motivation on transparency mechanism highlights that if CoC policies 
are well communicated and transparent between buyers’ and suppliers’; the supplier(s) 
develop trust in MNEs work practices, which ultimately motivate suppliers to comply 
with the set standards. Table-6 illustrates structural model’s parameter estimates, t-
values, and significance levels. 
 
 
Results of Specific Indirect Effects 
Two indirect effects were tested. It was hypothesized that suppliers’ motivations 
mediates relationship between hard power strategies and suppliers’ level of engagement 
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in managing their CoC compliance mechanism of monitoring and transparency. Intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivations were the two mediator variables in this study.  
Results of extrinsic motivation as a mediator variable. 
Hypotheses H1 through H3a and H3c predicted mediating effect of extrinsic 
motivation on suppliers’ level of engagement on monitoring and transparency. Analysis 
of results suggested that the indirect effect with extrinsic motivation as a mediator has a 
statistically significant positive affect both components of suppliers’ compliance 
mechanism (p-value < .05). Specific indirect effect of hard power strategies on 
monitoring (Standardized β=.150), and transparency was (Standardized β=.101).  
As extrinsic motivation includes orientation toward rewards, recognition, competition, 
and dictates of other people (Pierro et al., 2008); and application of hard power relies on 
reward and punishment (Pierro, Kruglanski, & Raven, 2012), the two concepts relates 
well. Therefore, significant effect of the extrinsic motivation on suppliers’ level of 
engagement in compliance mechanisms was justified.    
 
Results of intrinsic motivation as a mediator variable. 
Hypotheses H2 through H4a and H4c predicted the mediating effect of intrinsic 
motivation on suppliers’ level of engagement on monitoring and transparency. No 
significant specific indirect effect of intrinsic motivation was observed on suppliers’ level 
of engagement in managing their CoC compliance mechanism of monitoring and 
transparency.  
As hard power strategies were relatively unfriendly, controlling and coercive; 
contrary to the characteristics of intrinsic motivation that represent autonomy, personal 
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interests, excitement, and competence (Izard, 1978; Deci & Ryan, 1985), non-significant 
effect of hard power strategies on intrinsic motivation aligns with previous assertions. 
Additionally, Grasmick et al. (1991) indicated that the fear of shame, a self-imposed 
deterrent that stems from the sense of moral obligation or conscience, works during 
intrinsic motivation. Therefore, nature of the hard power strategies is in conflict with the 
characteristics of the intrinsic motivation. Table 7 presents specific indirect effects. 
 
Table 7  
Results of the Specific Indirect Effects 
 
 
Paths in the Model 
Standardized 
Parameter 
Estimates 
t-value p-value 
 
 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies (HP) 
Suppliers’ Extrinsic Motivation (EM) 
Monitoring 
 
 
.150 
 
2.531 
 
.011 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies (HP) 
Suppliers’ Extrinsic Motivation (EM) 
Transparency 
 
.101 2.102 .036 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies (HP) 
Suppliers’ Intrinsic Motivation (IM) 
Monitoring 
 
.004 .314 .754 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies (HP) 
Suppliers’ Intrinsic Motivation (IM) 
Transparency 
 
.015 .325 .745 
 
 
Results of Total Indirect Effects 
Although specific indirect effects of intrinsic motivation were non-significant, 
total indirect effects of hard power strategies on suppliers’ level of engagement in 
monitoring were statistically significant (p-value < .05), while statistically non-significant 
on transparency. Table 8 shows total indirect effects. 
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Table 8 
Results of the Total Indirect Effects 
 
 
Paths in the Model 
Standardized 
Parameter 
Estimates 
t-value p-value 
 
 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies (HP) 
Suppliers’ Monitoring (M) 
 
 
.154 
 
2.553 
 
.011 
Buyers’ Hard Power Strategies (HP) 
Suppliers’ Transparency (T) 
 
.116 1.861 .063 
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Summary of Hypotheses Tests  
All hypotheses tests were supported both in terms of significance and direction of 
their relationship, except H2 and H4(a). Table 9 shows summary of the research 
hypotheses tests. 
   Hypotheses H1 addressed relationship between buyers’ hard power strategies and 
suppliers’ extrinsic motivation. Results supported this relationship. H2 focused on the 
relationship between buyers’ hard power strategies and suppliers’ intrinsic motivation. 
The hypothesis was rejected as results were statistically non-significant. Further research 
with a larger sample size is recommended. 
Hypotheses H3(a) and H3(c) were proposed to analyze effect of extrinsic 
motivation on apparel suppliers’ level of engagement in managing suppliers’ CoC 
compliance mechanism of monitoring and transparency. Both hypotheses were found 
valid.  
Hypotheses H4(a) and H4(c) predicted the relationship between intrinsic 
motivation and apparel suppliers’ level of engagement in managing suppliers’ CoC 
compliance mechanism of monitoring and transparency. Results supported the effect of 
intrinsic motivation on transparency, while the effect on monitoring was not supported.  
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations were two mediator variables. Their effects 
were tested in this study. Hypotheses H1 through H3a and H3c addressed mediating 
effect of extrinsic motivation, and results confirm the presence of extrinsic motivation as 
a mediator variable. Hypotheses H2 through H4a and H4c tested mediating effect of 
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intrinsic motivation. Results of intrinsic motivation as a mediator variable were not 
supported.  
 
Table 9  
Summary of Hypotheses Tests.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Results 
H1:  
Apparel buyers’ hard power strategies         Suppliers’ Extrinsic 
motivation. 
 
 
 
Supported 
H2:  
Apparel buyers’ hard power strategies         Suppliers’ Intrinsic  
motivation. 
 
 
Not-
supported 
H3(a):  
Suppliers’ extrinsic motivation        Suppliers’ Level of Engagement  
in Monitoring. 
 
 
Supported 
H3(c):  
Suppliers’ extrinsic motivation         Suppliers’ Level of Engagement  
in Transparency. 
 
 
Supported 
H4(a):  
Suppliers’ intrinsic motivation        Suppliers’ Level of Engagement 
in Monitoring. 
 
 
Not-
supported 
H4(c):  
Suppliers’ intrinsic motivation          Suppliers’ Level of Engagement  
in Transparency. 
 
 
Supported 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS   
This chapter includes (a) Summary of the study, (b) Contributions and 
implications, and (c) Study limitations and future research suggestions.  
 
Summary of the Study 
 
Indian apparel industry is experiencing a boom in apparel export after the quota 
free trade (Gupta, 2012). However, incidences of poor working conditions, child labor, 
and labor issues, are becoming increasingly apparent in the global apparel industry 
(Loomis, 2015). Therefore, it is important to understand factors affecting compliance in 
an Indian apparel industry setting. As organizational behavior, psychology, leadership, 
and compliance literature emphasizes on the role of power and motivation separately, this 
research aimed to bridge-in the gap by connecting these two factors and evaluating their 
interaction effect on buyer-supplier compliance relationship. Specifically, this research 
was designed to investigate effect of MNEs’ power strategies on suppliers’ intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation, and its overall effect on the Indian suppliers’ compliance 
mechanism. This study contributed uniquely in highlighting underlying mechanism 
surrounding suppliers’ CoC implementation and management practices.  
Organizational behavior and leadership literature review indicated that 
compliance regulatory strategies (application of power by superiors) and motivation of 
subordinates are two potential factors affecting compliance. These were considered as 
main constructs of the buyer-supplier compliance relationship. Within CoC compliance 
context, it is assumed that MNEs are the leaders, as apparel supply chain is buyer 
 85 
 
 
(MNEs) driven. Thus, MNEs are supposed to have power to influence suppliers’ 
involvement through motivation, which ultimately affect suppliers’ engagement with 
compliance mechanisms of monitoring and transparency. 
Based on the above assumption, the study hypothesized the following: 
  
 Hypothesis 1a(b): Apparel buyers’ hard (or soft) power strategies are positively 
associated with Indian apparel suppliers’ extrinsic (or intrinsic) motivation. 
  Hypothesis 2a(b): Apparel buyers’ hard (or soft) power strategies are 
negatively associated with Indian apparel suppliers’ intrinsic (or extrinsic) 
motivation. 
 Hypothesis 3a, b & c: Suppliers’ extrinsic motivation positively influences 
suppliers’ monitoring, enforcement and transparency engagement levels. 
 Hypothesis 4a, b &c: Suppliers’ intrinsic motivation positively influences 
monitoring, enforcement and transparency engagement levels. 
 
To test above hypotheses, face-to-face interviews using existing scales of hard 
power strategies, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, monitoring, enforcement, and 
transparency, totaling a 40-item survey, was conducted among participants from Indian 
apparel export firms. Purposive sampling technique was used to recruit participants. Data 
was collected by an Indian marketing research firm, NextGen, and 210 usable survey 
responses were included in data analysis. Structure Equation Modeling (SEM) was 
conducted using Mplus software to run confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and test 
causal model. Results of scale reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) and assessment of the 
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measurement model led us to delete two latent variables, soft power strategies and 
enforcement, due to low Cronbach’s value and model fit indices. Therefore, H2b, H2b, 
H3b and H4b were removed from hypothesis testing. Finally, structural modeling tested 
the remaining hypotheses. Analysis of data resulted in several major findings.  
First, hard power strategies were found to significantly affect suppliers’ extrinsic 
motivation. Among the seven different hard power strategies that were punitive in nature 
were found to be effective in inducing extrinsic motivation in Indian apparel industry 
setting. The study results align with Pierro’s (2008) study that reported a positive 
relationship between hard power strategies and extrinsic motivation. Zaidi and Abbas 
(2011) also found a strong positive relationship between reward and punishment on 
extrinsic motivation of the employees. Therefore, study results implies that in the Indian 
apparel context MNEs coercive strategies were more effective than other hard power 
strategies in motivating suppliers’ to comply with the CoC policies.   
Second, a significant indirect effect of MNEs hard power strategies while having 
extrinsic motivation as a mediating variable was found on suppliers’ level of engagement 
in monitoring and transparency. In other words, it can be said that MNEs hard power 
strategies induces extrinsic motivation in Indian apparel suppliers’, which ultimately 
enhances suppliers’ level of engagement in monitoring and transparency mechanisms. 
Previously, researchers have shown that power and motivation play a major role in the 
compliance management process (Bass, 1985; Yukl, 1998). Specifically, the findings 
concur with Banjoko’s study (1996) that indicated manager’s use of money to reward or 
instilling fear of job loss to punish employees’ in gaining compliance and improving 
employees’ performance within an organization. More important, results indicated a large 
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effect of MNEs hard power strategies on monitoring mechanism, which was consistent 
with Bharadwaj (2011) study that indicated ‘deterrence’, the fear of negative 
consequences, as one of the main factor affecting compliance. In addition, May (2005) 
reported that the effectiveness of mandatory approach in regulatory compliance relies on 
the fear of deterrence. This suggested that perhaps extrinsic motivation increases 
suppliers’ level of engagement in compliance mechanisms, without effective monitoring, 
the effect of extrinsic motivation may diminish. 
Third, no significant effect of MNEs hard power strategies was found on 
suppliers’ intrinsic motivation. Although a negative relationship between hard power 
strategies and intrinsic motivation was hypothesized based on the previous empirical 
studies (Pierro, 2008); the positive relationship was evident, although statistically non-
significant. Thus, it is recommended to conduct future studies to evaluate effect of the 
hard power strategies on the intrinsic motivation to clarify relationship between the two 
constructs.  
Fourth, a significant effect of intrinsic motivation was observed on suppliers’ 
level of engagement on transparency, while a non-significant effect on monitoring. May 
(2005) found that regulated entities (suppliers’) comply due to the set of moral principles 
comprising of one’s sense of civic duty to obey laws, and general ideological values. As 
monitoring is a disciplinary technique that relies on external forces/pressures to improve 
performance (Arnaud & Chandon, 2013), the role of intrinsic motivation diminishes. On 
the other hand, transparency inculcates employees’ trust, sense of belongingness, 
improves work performance, and gives job satisfaction (Wong, 2017); hence intrinsic 
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motivation becomes important. Therefore, altogether this research presents an alternative 
pathway for suppliers’ compliance. 
 
Contributions and implications 
This study makes several important contributions to the body of knowledge of 
buyer-supplier compliance relationship within the Indian apparel supply chain context. 
This section discusses the study’s contributions and implications from the perspective of 
theory development, industry, and education.   
 
Theoretical Contributions and Implications 
First, results of the study showed that buyers’ hard power strategies play a critical 
role in motivating suppliers’ to comply with the CoCs and encourages their active 
engagement towards management of the CoC compliance mechanism. This conclusion 
emanates from the perusal of theories and diverse literature in organizational behavior 
and leadership, policy research, and human psychology. Given that previous literature has 
shown the importance of these factors separately in various contexts; connecting these 
factors and evaluating them simultaneously in this study adds a new dimension to the 
buyer-supplier compliance relationship. Specifically, this study highlights how buyers’ 
hard power strategies could directly or indirectly shape suppliers compliance 
mechanisms.  
Second, most of the existing literature on buyer-supplier CoC compliance 
relationship is mainly focused on the qualitative research techniques (Reich & Samet; 
1996; Egels-Zandén, 2007; Nadvi, 2008; Perry et al., 2013; Lund-Thomsen & Coe, 
2014). Even though these studies provide a detailed description of factors affecting 
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buyer-suppliers compliance relationship, it was limited in quantifying effects. This study 
was unique as it brought the buyer-supplier compliance relationship into the quantitative 
realm. Specifically, it explains the interaction of buyers’ power and suppliers’ motivation 
on their compliance relationship, thus offering a platform to investigate how MNEs’ hard 
power strategies could shape suppliers’ level of engagement in monitoring, enforcing, 
and transparency by inducing different motivations in suppliers.   
Third, most of the leadership studies in the past were focused on the behavior of 
leaders to explain followers’ compliance and motivation (Bass, 1985; Schien, 1992). 
However, looking only at leaders’ behavior to enact behavioral change in followers is, in 
many ways may not be enough in explaining compliance in followers (Barbuto, 2000). 
This is one of the few studies of its kind that developed and tested a framework to 
clarifies connection between leaders’ (equivalent to MNEs in this study) influence 
strategies, and identify contributing factor of motivation in the influence process, 
importantly from the followers’ (equivalent to suppliers’ in this study) perspective. Thus, 
it helps to explain why followers’ (suppliers’) comply with leaders (MNEs) directive.  
Besides, it also gives a deeper understanding of the interactive nature of the compliance 
influence process. 
Fourth, this study finding suggested that the path to induce motivation among 
firm managers has a major influence on their strategy to formulate and develop 
compliance mechanism in order to stay compliant with CoC policies. This observation 
emphasizes on the psychology of the manager and confirms to the notion that only design 
of a good policy does not guarantee its success in achieving policy goals (Cerna, 2013). 
Therefore, to achieve policy goals it is essential to create a positive environment where 
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managers can stay highly motivated. This facet of human psychology was hidden in the 
policy development literature, thus presented study sheds light on the suppliers’ 
motivation and adds a new chapter to the existing literature.  
Finally, the study identifies value of inducements in keeping suppliers motivated. 
It states that when suppliers’ are motivated they should receive recognition of being 
compliant from buyers’. Contrarily, enforcement strategies, including sanctioning 
suppliers, should be emphasized. Further, when suppliers are found self-motivated 
(intrinsic motivation) to be compliant, buyers and suppliers should work together to 
strengthen suppliers’ monitoring and transparency system. Since compliance literature 
seldom reported on the effect of specific motivations on different components of 
compliance mechanisms, this study contributes in developing a unique knowledge on 
suppliers’ compliance management system. 
 
Contributions and Implications for the Industry 
Over the years, the study of power source and motivation had been a central 
concept in organizational psychology, as well as in other analyses of social interaction 
processes (Pierro et al., 2008). This research provides an empirical evidence of the 
interaction of MNEs’ power and suppliers’ motivation, and its effect on suppliers’ 
compliance mechanism. Results of the study specifically highlight a situation, in context 
of Indian apparel industry, where factory managers gets motivated by recognition of 
being complaint from other factories and buyers’ (a form of extrinsic motivation), 
suppliers’ monitoring, particularly through professional auditors, holds promise. On the 
other hand, intrinsic motivation among the Indian factory managers emphasized on 
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transparent business practices. Therefore, in order to develop a well-integrated CoC 
compliance system, MNEs should use their hard powers in such a way that it may induce 
both extrinsic as well as intrinsic motivations. Similar suggestions were made by May 
(2005) where use of both the deterrent fear (a form of extrinsic motivation) and a sense of 
civic duty (intrinsic motivation) were proposed to keep firms compliant, rather than 
relying on any one. 
Further, this research provides empirical evidence on MNEs hard power sources 
that they frequently utilize in encouraging apparel suppliers’ from developing economies, 
like India, in staying complaint with their CoC policies. The study results specifically 
highlight usefulness of the coercive power strategies in the Indian apparel market context. 
Although, May and Winter (1999) indicated that it is necessary to get tough up to a point 
in engaging firms to comply, but beyond a certain point the threat of coercion can be 
counterproductive. Hence, it is recommended that MNEs need to be strategic and 
cautious in using coercive power strategies, as an overly coercive power may deter 
suppliers’ from being complaint. Additionally, MNEs are suggested to rely not only on 
one or two strategies, as evident in this study; rather, they should be choosing strategies 
constructively from the repertoire of available hard power sources so as to aid suppliers’ 
in getting motivated and engaged in compliance with CoCs. Also, the applicability of 
hard power strategies in this study demonstrate that merely stating or demanding 
compliance with CoC policies from suppliers may not give desired outcome. MNEs 
involvement, particularly in monitoring suppliers’ compliance is equally important. 
In addition, the study results have implications for Indian apparel suppliers’. 
Specifically, this study demonstrated that to enhance suppliers’ level of engagement in 
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compliance related activities, factories need to develop a monitoring system that not only 
enlist monitoring standards and policies, but also give specific details, criteria, and time 
frames of how monitoring will be conducted at their factories. In addition, the study 
emphasizes on the role of professional external (third-party) auditors in 
monitoring/managing suppliers’ compliance standards. This knowledge could be used by 
Indian apparel suppliers’ in developing a compliance mechanism/system that could 
engage them in adopting compliance practices more responsibly. 
  
Education Contributions and Implications  
The study results emphasize on the interaction of the buyer’s power strategies and 
suppliers’ motivations in compliance relationship and managing CoC mechanisms. 
Managers in public or private organizations acquire and use different power sources to 
motivate employees to manage their compliance and accomplishing organizational goals. 
Similarly, in the global apparel supply chain context it is important that business 
managers understand varied sources of power available, learn how and when to use them, 
and be able to anticipate its probable effects on suppliers’ compliance outcomes. Bolman 
and Deal (1992) suggested that in an organization the choice of appropriate power 
strategies by business managers is not a matter of common sense; instead they are trained 
to identify different influence strategies and prepared to utilize the most appropriate 
strategy from repertoire of strategies learnt in the classroom. Likewise, it is anticipated 
that students, who are also the future business managers and perspective leaders of the 
supply chain, should be trained to understand buyer-supplier power dynamics. This 
training will equip them with an insight to recognize and respond to the supply chain 
challenges in a constructive and responsible manner, while balancing business interests 
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and serving needs of the society. These efforts will contribute towards weaving the 
threads of business and society into one coherent pattern that can create value both within 
and outside the walls of the supply chain. 
Given the enduring importance of social responsibility within the global apparel 
supply chain, compliance with CoCs is a key requirement for all global buyers/MNEs. 
MNEs require supplier factories to follow their CoC policies to ensure proper working 
environment and workers’ welfare. Therefore, it is recommended that academic units and 
educators may incorporate CoC or compliance related management topics and issues into 
academic curriculum. Besides, researchers of the presented study also hope that this 
research will stimulates further discussion on alternative pathways on gaining compliance 
from the supplier factories from different parts of the developing world. 
Lastly, this study showed that MNEs use mainly those power strategies that were 
coercive in nature, while limited in utilizing reward and legitimate powers (sources of 
other hard power strategies) in encouraging suppliers’ compliance. Hence, suppliers were 
found to comply due to the external pressure while lacking self-motivation. As this study 
showed the probable effects of buyers’ power interaction with suppliers’ motivation on 
suppliers compliance mechanism, it may guide policy makers in the Indian apparel 
industry in deciding a right mix of strategies useful in fostering appropriate motivations 
pertaining to compliance. This may ultimately help in devising incentives and 
interventions appropriate to addressing non-compliance issues within the global apparel 
industry.  
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Study Limitations and Future Research Suggestions 
 
As with any research, this study has certain limitations, thus leading to future 
research opportunities. Following points could be helpful in designing future studies. 
First, this study’s sample was focused only on apparel export firms from northern apparel 
cluster of India (National Capital Region, Delhi, India). According to a report by Apparel 
Export Promotion Council of India (2009), besides NCR; Tirupur, Bangalore, Chennai, 
and Jaipur together accounts for the export of more than 70% of the apparel products 
from India. In future, other major apparel clusters from different parts of India could be 
studied to expand the scope of this study and to understand the variation among 
supplier’s motivations and compliance mechanisms across India. 
 Second, study’s sample relied on purposive sampling, which may not be a true 
representative of the Indian apparel export firm population. Future researches will be 
aimed to have a larger sample size in combination with a randomized sampling 
technique. Thus, trends reflected in this study may not be generalized to the entire Indian 
apparel industry setting.   
Third, the latent variable of soft power strategies was dropped from this study due 
to poor reliability (Cronbach’s alpha=.443), thus effect of soft power strategies could not 
be captured. This study used Interpersonal Power Inventory (IPI) scale that had 
previously been tested as highly reliable and therefore, poor reliability of IPI scale was 
surprising. This scale was originally developed to measure power strategies in a different 
context than this study, and tested on the sample population from a developed country. In 
future, validation of the scale will be required. It could be done through cross-cultural 
analysis of the scales and by its validation in an Indian apparel export industry context. 
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This contextual validation will be helpful in examination of the individual items of this 
scale in the global apparel supply chain and to potentially select most appropriate items, 
or revise and add new items based on the developing country apparel industry context.  
In addition, in regard to the use of soft power in India, Purushothaman (2010) 
noted that due to high poverty, large income gap, sub-standard conditions, bureaucratic 
procedures, and widespread corruption the use of soft power is limited. He further 
indicated that soft power grows out of the cultural milieu of the society. Problems 
indicated by Purushothaman could hence be attributed to the inability to capture soft 
powers in this study. Further, Podsakoff & Schriesheim (1985) indicated that there has 
been relatively little consideration given to the effects that sample differences might have 
on the types of power used by the superiors (MNEs) and the way subordinates 
(equivalent to the suppliers’ in this study) respond to those power strategies. It is 
anticipated that MNEs face different situations while sourcing from different developing 
countries, and uses varying power strategies depending on the prevailing conditions of 
the country. It ultimately affects suppliers’ compliance outcome. Therefore, more 
attention in future could be directed towards studying sample differences in power related 
studies. 
Fourth, the latent variable of suppliers’ level of engagement in enforcement due to 
the poor fit of the measurement model resulted in the deletion of this construct from 
structural modeling. The scale used to measure enforcement was originally developed to 
test the sample population from a developed country. In addition, it was also realized that 
the individual items of enforcement scale were negatively toned, while rest all other items 
of the study were on a positive tone. Therefore, in future it is recommended that the tone 
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of the individual items throughout the entire survey could be kept same, probably more 
positive, and that may reflect true responses. Besides, contextual validation of the scale is 
recommended in future. 
Fifth, this study highlights the relative effect of buyer-supplier power interaction. 
However, emphasis was given only to the suppliers’ perception of buyers’ strategies. 
Fung (1991) indicated that an agent’s choice of a particular power strategy is based on 
the evaluation of relative agent/target power; suggesting use of power strategy might vary 
according to the relative status of the agent and the target. Therefore, in future it will be 
interesting to study how buyer’s choice of power strategies varies with evaluations of 
their own power, and its interaction with the levels of supplier’s power.  
Lastly, data were self-reported and subject to biases. However, several researchers 
have indicated that self-reported data are not as limited as commonly believed (Alper, 
Tjosvold, & Law, 1998; Balzer & Sulsky, 1992). Moreover, present study adopted 
Somach and Drach-Zahavy (2001), and Yukl’s (1989) recommendation of reliance upon 
subordinates’ (suppliers’) perception of superiors’ (MNEs) power strategies, in contrast 
to other studies that relied on the perceptions of superiors (MNEs) in describing their own 
power strategies they use. As attributions about individuals are made on the basis of 
perceived (and not objective) behavior, these attributions may differ considerably 
between agent and the target (Bass, 1990). In future, biasness due to the objective nature 
of this study could be overcome including other methods, such as observations for 
assessing power and influence strategy (Somach & Drach-Zahavy, 2001).  In addition, it 
is also recommended to consider other factors such as firm size, firm history etc. that 
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were not considered in this study, as it may introduce bias and affect suppliers’ 
compliance levels.  
In conclusion, this research, despite its limitation, serves an important function in 
investigating buyer-supplier compliance relationship, through the lens of the use of 
buyers’ power strategies on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in the Indian apparel 
industry context. 
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Survey Instrument 
 
This questionnaire is used only for academic research. Your responses will be kept 
strictly confidential and anonymous. By completing the surveys, you agree that you understand 
the procedures and any risks and benefits involved in this research. You are free to refuse to 
participate or to withdraw your consent to participate in this research at any time without penalty 
or prejudice; your participation is entirely voluntary. Your privacy will be protected because you 
will not be identified by name as a participant in this project. Your privacy will be protected, as 
all the information is strictly confidential. If you have any questions concerning your rights as a 
participant, you may contact Campus Institutional Review Board at +1-573-882-9585. If you 
have any questions regarding research, you may contact Geetika Jaiswal at 
gjgx6@mail.missouri.edu. Please answer the questions. Thank you for your time and your honest 
responses.  
Screening Questions:  
Do you work in apparel manufacturing factory that export clothing/apparels to companies 
in developed countries like America, Europe, Canada, Australia? 
Yes _____ 
No _____ 
 
Are you in any compliance management capacity within your factory?   
Yes ______ 
No______ 
 
If “yes,” please specify your current position in the factory ______________________ 
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Part I: Buyers’ Power Strategies 
Often buyers from developed countries ask factories to comply with their code of conduct 
(CoC) policies while giving contract/orders to them. Sometimes factories resist doing so or do 
not follow buyer’s directions exactly. Other times, they will do exactly as their buyers’ requests. 
We are interested in those situations which lead you, as a compliance manager, to follow the 
requests of your buyers. Please indicate how likely each descriptive statement below would 
represent a reason for your factory’s compliance with buyers' request regarding CoC policy 
implementation. Your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please listen to each 
statement carefully, and indicate the most appropriate response on the scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
 
(3) 
Agree 
 
 
(4) 
Strongly 
agree 
 
(5) 
1 Our buyers could help us get new contracts. 1 2 3 4 5 
2 
My factory liked our buyers, and their approval is 
important to us. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 
Our buyer could make it more difficult for us to 
get new contracts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 
Just knowing that our factory is on the bad list of 
the buyers would upset us.  
1 2 3 4 5 
5 
As a supplier, my factory had an obligation to do 
as my buyers have said. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
My factory had made some mistakes and 
therefore felt that we owed compliance to our 
buyers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 
Due to the past contracts my factory had 
received, my factory feel obliged to comply. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 
My factory realized that buyer needs assistance 
and cooperation from those working with them.  
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
My factory sees our buyers as someone we could 
identify with. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 
Our buyers probably know the best way of 
achieving compliance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 
Whenever our buyer request changes, my factory 
could see why the change was necessary. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Part II: Suppliers’ Motivation 
 
The statements below describe the sources of motivation that you may have while 
complying with your buyer’s code of conduct (CoC) policies. Please rate each statement in terms 
of how truly each descriptive statement below would represent a source of motivation for your 
compliance with buyers' request regarding CoC policy implementation. Your responses will be 
kept in absolute confidence. Please listen to each statement carefully, and indicate the most 
appropriate number on the scale. 
 
 
 
 
Never or 
almost 
never true 
for my 
factory 
 
(1) 
Occasionally  
true for my 
factory 
 
 
 
(2) 
Frequently 
true for 
my factory 
 
 
 
(3) 
Always or 
almost 
always 
true for 
my factory  
 
(4) 
1 My factory enjoys tackling problems that are completely 
new to us. 
 
1 2 3 4 
2 My factory enjoys solving complex problems. 
 
1 2 3 4 
3 The more difficult the problem, the more enthusiastically 
my factory tries to solve it. 
 
1 2 3 4 
4 What matters most to my factory is enjoying what we do. 
 
1 2 3 4 
5 It is most important to my factory to be able to do what we 
most enjoy. 
 
1 2 3 4 
6 My factory is strongly motivated by the recognition we can 
earn from other factories by being compliant. 
 
1 2 3 4 
7 My factory wants other buyers to find out how good we 
really are at achieving compliance. 
 
1 2 3 4 
8 To my factory, success means doing better than other 
factories. 
 
1 2 3 4 
9 My factory is keenly aware of the promotional goals we 
have for ourselves. 
 
1 2 3 4 
10 My factory is keenly aware of the income goals we have for 
ourselves. 
 
1 2 3 4 
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Part III (a): Level of Engagement in Monitoring 
 
The statements below describe the existence of monitoring systems, monitoring/auditing 
processes, protocols, and procedures; and the position of monitoring actors; used by factories, in 
general, in complying with the code of conduct (CoC) policies. Please indicate the level of your 
factory’s engagement in monitoring the implementation of CoC policies. Your responses will be 
kept in absolute confidence. Please listen to each statement carefully, and indicate the most 
appropriate number on the scale. 
 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
 
(3) 
Agree 
 
 
(4) 
Strongly 
agree 
 
(5) 
1 Monitoring system exist in my factory. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 My factory’s CoCs give no specific details 
other than monitoring will take place. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 Some part of the monitoring process is 
referred in my factory CoCs, however specific 
criteria for assessment or time frames are 
lacking. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 My factory’s CoCs give a good insight into 
the monitoring process and system, including 
the criteria for assessment. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 The existence of my factory’s monitoring 
system is well known. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 My factory conduct monitoring only by 
themselves.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 My factory conducts monitoring through 
external professional auditors. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 My factory conduct monitoring through 
independent bodies such as, legal authorities, 
social interest groups, non-government 
organizations, and business support groups. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Part III (b): Level of Engagement in Enforcement 
 
The statements below describe the ways in which individual factories respond to non-
compliances with the code of conduct (CoC) policies. Please indicate how your factory or your 
buyers’ treat non-compliance with CoC policies. Your responses will be kept in absolute 
confidence. Please listen to each statement carefully, and indicate the most appropriate number 
on the scale. 
 
 Least 
likely 
 
(1) 
 
Unlikely 
 
 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
 
(3) 
Likely 
 
 
(4) 
Most 
likely 
 
(5) 
1 My factory does not receive any sanction in case of non-
compliance.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 Buyers’ sanction does not have any large implications on 
my factory, such as, warning and exclusion of certain 
membership.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 Upon non-compliance by my factory, buyers threaten to 
terminate the business contracts. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 My factory has provisions of sanctioning third 
parties/suppliers or sub-contractors for non-compliances. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Part III (c): Level of Engagement in Transparency 
 
The statements below describe the ways in which individual factory make the 
information available or disclose information to its stakeholders, such as buyers, buying agents, 
sub-contractors, and workers. Please indicate the level of your factory’s engagement in making 
the information accessible to its stakeholders. Your responses will be kept in absolute 
confidence. Please listen to each statement carefully, and indicate the most appropriate number 
on the scale. 
 
 
 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
 
(3) 
Agree 
 
 
(4) 
Strongly 
agree 
 
(5) 
1 My factory is willing to share information 
with stakeholders even when it may make 
the company look bad. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 My factory provides stakeholders with a 
learning opportunity about itself. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 My factory enables stakeholders to know 
what we are doing. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 My factory is willing to explain its decisions 
to the stakeholders. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 My factory is willing to share just about any 
information stakeholders’ request from it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 My factory wants stakeholders to understand 
what we are doing. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 My factory is open to sharing information 
with stakeholders. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Part IV: Demographics 
 
Please fill in the information below (give the best estimates): 
 
1. Your age: _______ (years) 
 
2. Indicate your gender ______ (male or female or other)  
 
3. Total years of experience in apparel/clothing manufacturing company/factory that 
export products to other countries: ________   
 
4. Years of experiences in the current factory: ________  
 
5. The level of education you have completed (please pick one). 
a. Less than high school 
b. High school diploma 
c. College degree or Bachelor’s degree 
d. Post-Graduate degree  
e. Doctorate degree  
 
6. Your factory is ___ years old________ (please specify the year the factory was 
establishment). 
 
7. Your factory is located in ________ (please specify city).  
 
8. Your factory’s product category is/are (you may pick as many options as are 
applicable)  
a. Men’s clothing 
b. Women’s clothing 
c. Children’s clothing 
d. Active wear 
e. Any other textile product, please specify _________________ 
9. To what continents does your factory export (you may pick as many options as 
are applicable) 
a. Europe 
b. North America 
c. Asia 
d. Australia 
e. Other, please specify________________ 
 
10. The total number of current employees in your factory  ______________ 
 
11. Annual sales volume of your factory (in Rupees or U.S. Dollars) 
________________ 
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CONSENT TO ACT AS A HUMAN PARTICIPANT 
PROJECT TITLE: 
Buyers Power Strategies and Suppliers Compliance Mechanism: Case of Indian 
apparel export firm. 
   
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: 
Geetika Jaiswal, Ph.D. Candidate  
 
DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURES: 
The purpose of this quantitative research is to investigate influence of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) compliance regulatory strategies, specifically their 
power strategies, and suppliers’ motivation on the suppliers’ compliance mechanism 
(monitoring, enforcement and transparency). Structural equation modeling will be 
conducted to study to buyer-supplier compliance behavior.  
  
To conduct this study, face-to-face structured survey will be administered. The 
survey consists of four parts, which measures (a) buyers’ power strategies; (b) suppliers’ 
motivation; (c) compliance mechanism including, code of conduct monitoring, 
enforcement and transparency; and (d) demographic variable. 
  
CONFIDENTIALITY: 
Data will be saved anonymously. Any electronic files will be saved with numeric 
codes, with no personal identifiers. Throughout the procedures, if you feel uncomfortable 
with any questions or experiences, you may stop participation at any time. Finally, only 
the researcher will have access to the data and the aggregated data will be analyzed and 
shared for publication. The data will be kept for seven years after the study has been 
completed. 
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RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS: 
It is anticipated that there are no physical, psychological or sociological risks 
involved in participating in this study. 
  
BENEFITS TO SOCIETY: 
The result will aid policy-makers in deciding the appropriate mix of strategies, 
incentives and interventions in addressing non-compliance issues within the global 
apparel supply chain. The research findings will all help multinational enterprises from 
developed countries in identifying the motivational patterns popular among the apparel 
suppliers (from developing countries), and comprehending the consequences of 
differential motivations in achieving the desired level of compliance. 
 
CONSENT: 
  You are free to refuse to participate or to withdraw your consent to participate in 
this research at any time without penalty or prejudice; your participation is entirely 
voluntary.  Your privacy will be protected because you will not be identified by name or 
any other type of identifier. If you have any questions concerning your rights as a 
participant, you may contact Campus Institutional Review Board at 573-882-9585.  If 
you have any questions regarding the research itself, you may contact me by e-mail at 
gjgx6@mail.missouri.edu. 
  
Thank you in advance for your assistance and time. Please keep this consent form 
with you for future references. 
  
  If you agree with the informed consent form and you are above 18 years of age, 
please proceed to complete the survey. 
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Questionnaire Number                                                                              Code Number in   
                                                                                                                   Data Analysis   
 
Part I (a): Buyers’ Power Strategies - Hard Power (HP) 
 
Codes 
 
1 Our buyers could help us get new contracts. 
 
HP1 
2 My factory liked our buyers, and their approval is important to 
us. 
 
HP2 
3 Our buyer could make it more difficult for us to get new 
contracts. (R) 
HP3 
4 Just knowing that our factory is on the bad list of the buyers 
would upset us. (R) 
 
HP4 
5 As a supplier, my factory had an obligation to do as my buyers 
have said. 
 
HP5 
6 My factory had made some mistakes and therefore felt that we 
owed compliance to our buyers. (R) 
 
HP6 
7 Due to the past contracts my factory had received, my factory 
feel obliged to comply. 
 
HP7 
Part I (b): Buyers’ Power Strategies - Soft Power (SP) 
 
8 My factory realized that buyer needs assistance and cooperation 
from those working with them.  
 
SP1 
9 My factory sees our buyers as someone we could identify with. 
 
SP2 
10 Our buyers probably know the best way of achieving 
compliance. 
 
SP3 
11 Whenever our buyer request changes, my factory could see why 
the change was necessary. 
 
SP4 
Part II (a): Suppliers’ Motivations - Intrinsic Motivation (IM) 
 
1 My factory enjoys tackling problems that are completely new to 
us. 
 
IM1 
2 My factory enjoys solving complex problems. 
 
IM2 
3 The more difficult the problem, the more enthusiastically my 
factory tries to solve it. 
IM3 
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4 What matters most to my factory is enjoying what we do. 
 
IM4 
5 It is most important to my factory to be able to do what we most 
enjoy. 
 
IM5 
Part II (b): Suppliers’ Motivations - Extrinsic Motivation (EM) 
 
6 My factory is strongly motivated by the recognition we can earn 
from other factories by being compliant. 
 
EM1 
7 My factory wants other buyers to find out how good we really are 
at achieving compliance. 
 
EM2 
8 To my factory, success means doing better than other factories. 
 
EM3 
9 My factory is keenly aware of the promotional goals we have for 
ourselves. 
 
EM4 
10 My factory is keenly aware of the income goals we have for 
ourselves. 
 
EM5 
 
Part III (a): Engagement level in Compliance Mechanism – Monitoring (M) 
 
1 Monitoring system exist in my factory. 
 
M1 
2 My factory’s CoCs give no specific details other than monitoring 
will take place. (R) 
 
M2 
3 Some part of the monitoring process is referred in my factory 
CoCs, however specific criteria for assessment or time frames are 
lacking. (R) 
 
M3 
4 My factory’s CoCs give a good insight into the monitoring process 
and system, including the criteria for assessment. 
 
M4 
5 The existence of my factory’s monitoring system is well known. 
 
M5 
6 My factory conducts monitoring only by themselves. (R) M6 
7 My factory conducts monitoring through external professional 
auditors. 
 
M7 
8 My factory conduct monitoring through independent bodies such 
as, legal authorities social interest groups, non-government 
organizations and business support groups. 
M8 
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Part III (b): Engagement level in Compliance Mechanism – Enforcement (E) 
 
1 My factory does not receive any sanction in case of non-
compliance. (R) 
 
E1 
2 Buyers’ sanction does not have any large implications on my 
factory, such as, warning and exclusion of certain membership. 
(R) 
 
E2 
3 Upon non-compliance by my factory, buyers threaten to terminate 
the business contracts.  
 
E3 
4 My factory has provisions of sanctioning third parties/suppliers or 
sub-contractors for non-compliances. 
 
E4 
Part III (c): Engagement level in Compliance Mechanism – Transparency (T) 
 
1 My factory is willing to share information with stakeholders even 
when it may make the company look bad. 
 
T1 
2 My factory provides stakeholders with a learning opportunity 
about itself. 
 
T2 
3 My factory enables stakeholders to know what we are doing. 
 
T3 
4 My factory is willing to explain its decisions to the stakeholders. 
 
T4 
5 My factory is willing to share just about any information 
stakeholders’ request from it. 
 
T5 
6 My factory wants stakeholders to understand what we are doing. 
 
T6 
7 My factory is open to sharing information with stakeholders. T7 
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